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Duopolistic Competition in Cable Television:
Implications for Public Policy
Thoma W. HAWi
Most cable television systems in the United States operate as
monopolies, typically obtaining an exclusive franchise from a
municipality to exploit consumer demand within a specified service
area. Unlike most traditional public utility regulators,' however, local
municipalities cannot set the rates charged by the local cable
monopolies that they establish.1 While exclusive franchises are the
overwhelmingly dominant market structure in the cable television
industry, direct competition between normally monopolistic cable
television companies--a phenomenon referred to as an overbuild
because both companies have placed cable systems in the same
geographic area-currently occurs in at least three dozen jurisdictions
nationally.
Overbuilding is an important form of market rivalry both on its own
merits and because of the public policy considerations surrounding the
regulation of the cable television industry. From an industrial
organization perspective, overbuilds pit firms in duopolistic
competition,' characterized by geographically clear service areas,
economies of scope and density, and non-salvageable investment. Even
in this type of market environment, the policy alternative of free entry
may still offer a mechanism for proconsumer discipline of local cable
markets where rate regulation is either ineffective or infeasible.
Furthermore, the practice of granting exclusive licenses to cable
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1. See The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, § 2,47 U.S.C. § 543 (Supp. V 1987).
The Cable Communications Policy Act gives existing franchises two major advantages in
negotiating with municipalities: (1) it effectively bars local governments from regulating rates,
and (2) it shifts the franchise renewal burden to the municipality, which is now forced to prove
that a contract should not be extended in order to deny franchise renewal. Both measures
vastly reduce local governments ability to make demands upon cable firms or even to enforce
compliance with existing terms. Municipal government discretion and influence have not been
completely eliminated from the franchising process, but the plausible consumer welfare
rationale for local regulation, i.e., rate controls to constrain prices beneath monopoly levels, has
evaporated.
2. Duopolistic competition is defined as head-to-head rivalry between exactly two firms.
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television companies has been attacked as violative of First Amendment
rights. Constitutional challenges to exclusive licensing in cable are
prompting courts and juries to grapple with the issue of whether cable
franchises are natural monopolies and to what extent consumer welfare
would be affected by allowing competitive market forces to operate
under a liberal franchising policy.'
This Article attempts to put the debate over the structure of the
cable television industry in a public policy context; it analyzes the
welfare implications of overbuilding using a public choice model that
assumes rational political agents and takes into account the institutional
realities of ongoing duopolistic competition in Community Antenna
Television (CATV).4  This analysis concludes that the standard
cost/benefit calculus overstates the cost of direct competition.
Furthermore, it finds that the difficulties faced by competitive entrants
in cable arise not so much from natural monopoly conditions as from
the ability of incumbent suppliers to transfer monopoly rents to
municipal officials so as to protect their exclusive franchise. As a result,
the local franchising process is likely to be biased in favor of monopoly
market structures such that a national policy which gives local
authorities the ability to choose between free entry and monopolistic
market structures generally will prove hostile to competition and to
consumer interests. These results suggest that competitive entry in
local cable television markets should be per se legal and actively
encouraged by policymakers at the municipal, state, and federal levels.
This Article attempts to focus, sort, and critique current analysis of
competitive issues in cable. Part I frames the problem. Part II
presents three alternative frameworks used by economists to conduct
such analysis. Part III amends the most promising of these three
frameworks to include important public choice considerations. This
approach uses the methods and basic insights of microeconomics and
public choice theory to model the likely behavior of municipal
franchisors in a variety of market environments. Parts IV and V use
this amended model to analyze the cable industry. Part IV discusses
the peculiar regulatory tools now available to franchising agents in the
U.S. cable television marketplace. Part V describes two ongoing
examples of duopolistic competition in CATV, highlighting the strategic
3. See, e.g., Meyerson, The Cable Communications Policy of 1984: A Balancing Acton the Coaxial
Wires, 19 GA. L REv. 543 (1985).
4. "Cable TV" refers to all wire delivery systems, including unfranchised SMATV (satellite
master antenna television) systems. By contrast, this Article deals specfically with wire delivery
cable television systems that require local government franchises because their wires cross public
rights-of-way, often labled "CATV."
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and regulatory issues. The analysis concludes by comparing the public
policy implications associated with giving local franchisors substantial
discretionary authority (the status quo) with the alternative proposed
in this Article of constraining their authority with fixed rules favoring
open entry.
I. The Existence and First Amendment Importance of Duopolistic
Competition
According to U.S. cable industry sources, CATV overbuilds exist in
over forty jurisdictions.' The economic feasibility of such head-to-head
rivalry, though in dispute, is of profound legal significance. The
activities in which cable operators engage implicate First Amendment
interests,' and nonfranchised cable operators have challenged exclusive
franchising as an infringement of their First Amendment rights.
Municipalities have defended franchising by claiming that natural
monopoly cost conditions exist in the local CATV market and that
these conditions make exclusive franchising necessary.7
Courts have responded to this contention in two different ways.
Some courts have rejected this claim as a matter of law,' relying on the
holding in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. brnillo.' There, the
Supreme Court held that market power is an insufficient justification
for the regulation of protected expression. Other courts, however,
have found the issue of the existence of monopoly cost conditions to be
an important factor in the analysis of First Amendment claims."0
Judges have requested that juries determine as a question of fact
whether monopoly cost conditions existed in a particular locale, and
juries have reached different conclusions in different cases." Where
5. Paul Kagan Assocs., Overbuilds-Past, Present And Pending, CABLE TELEVISION
FRANCHISING, October 17, 1988, at 1-2 (Supp.).
6. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. 1322, 1328 (E.D.
Cal. 1987); Norwest Cable Communications Partnership v. City of St. Paul, No. 3-93 Civ. 1228
(D. Minn., Sept. 1, 1988).
8. Preferred Communications v. Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), affd on
narrower grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986); Century Federal v. City of Palo Alto, 669 F. Supp. 954,
964-65 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Group W Cable, Inc. v. City of Santa Cruz, 648 F. Supp. 1465, 1467
(N.D. Cal. 1984).
9. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
10. See, e.g., Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. at 1322; St. Paul, No. 3-93 Civ. at 1228 (D. Minn.,
Sept. 1. 1988).
11. Compare Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. at 1328 (special verdict of jury finding Sacramento
not be a natural monopoly) with St. Paul, No. 3-93 Civ. 1228 (D. Minn., Sept. 1, 1988) (verdict
ofjury finding that St. Paul market could support only one cable company).
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it has been found that no monopoly cost conditions existed and
"competition was feasible and sustainable," the municipality has been
required to advance a substantial interest to justify awarding the
exclusive franchise.U1 Whether these investigations into the existence
of monopoly cost conditions are relevant as a matter of First
Amendment law has been seriously questioned by both sides of the
franchising debate."
Advocates of franchise monopoly have argued that the small number
of duopolies in the cable industry, out of a universe of 9,010 cable
systems, stems from the financial irrationality of such rivalry.4 They
interpret the infrequency of competition as a confirmation of the
subadditive cost conditions15 present in cable, and proceed to build a
defense of monopoly franchising by municipal governments on a
natural monopoly rationale.
Some of the most vociferous advocates of franchise monopoly and
the natural monopoly rationale are current cable franchise operators.
Overbuilds are not popular in the CATV distribution industry. One
commentator notes:
In almost all cases, cable operators are unanimous in their
assessment that overbuilds do not work as a result of the large
capital requirements needed up front and the necessity of
cornering at least 40 percent of the market once the system is
built in order to obtain a return on that investment. 16
A cable consultant voices the standard view that "overbuilds are really
duplication," and goes on to assert that overbuilds are socially
inefficient:
12. Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. at 1339.
13. For discussion of this issue, see Lee, Cable Franchising and the First Amendment, 36 VAND.
LR. 867 (1983); Brenner, Cable Tevision and the Freedom of Expression, 1988 DuKE UJ. 329;
Schildhause, Can Local Franchising of Cable TV Be Thted?, 6 COMM. LAw. 20, 24 (1988). For
a rendition of the natural monopoly argument as a defense of franchising, see Hazlett, Private
Monopoly and the Publi Interest. An Economic Analysis of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. PA.
L REV. 1335 (1986) [hereinafter Private Monopoly].
14. NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASS'N, RESEARCH & POLICY ANALYSIS DEP'T, CABLE
TELEVISION DEVELOPMENT 17 (Table)(Dec. 1989).
15. Subadditivity of costs is often given as the test for natural monopoly. It is defined as
a market in which supplying the relevant quantity demanded is achieved more economically
by one firm than by two or more: C (&q,) < EC(q,), for n a 2 where c(q) = total costs of
-1 i-I
producing q output. See W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 62-67 (1982).
16. Kahn, How Safe is Cable's Nlatural Monopoly?', CABLEVISION, October 13, 1986, at 60,
63 [hereinafter Munger Kahn].
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Allegedly, this duplication of services is good for the subscriber,
... but it isn't because basic rates have to be higher to support
both operators. And what usually happens is that one of the two
operators goes down the tubes. The ultimate loser isn't just the
overbuilder, but the subscriber as well.' 7
The cable industry's argument is refutable. As any duplication
problem stems from the investment of sunk capital," duplication is
only a problem for operators. Consumers must experience a
heightened competition for their business when overbuilding occurs. 19
While overbuilding an existing cable system can lower the profitability
of the incumbent operator, it unambiguously improves the position of
consumers who face prices determined not by historical costs, but by
the interplay of supply and demand.
Critics of monopoly franchising have argued that local government
policies rather than the economics of cable delivery have created
monopoly conditions. As of October 1987, municipalities had issued
only 165 multiple, overlapping franchise awards.20 Most of the
remaining several thousand local cable markets were characterized by
single franchises.2' Richard Posner, for example, was an early critic
of municipal restrictions on entry in the cable industry, blaming the
illegality of multiple entry as the factor substantially responsible for
discouraging competition:
As the cable television business now operates, subscribers are
rarely if ever given a choice between cable companies; only one
company solicits their patronage. The immediate cause of this,
however, is not any inherent characteristic of cable television but
the fact that a cable company must obtain a municipal franchise
17. Moozakis, Range Wars, CABLE TELEVISION Bus., Sept. 15, 1985, at 20, 23 (quoting T.
Alexander, president of Alexander & Assocs., a unit of Tampa, Fla.-based Communications
Equity Asocs.).
18. Sunk capital refers to investments that, once made, cannot be easily and cheaply
diverted to alternative markets. In cable, the sunk portion of investment is composed of those
expenditures that are highly nonsalvageable, primarily expenditures for the cable plant
construction.
19. Data support this analysis. A recent Touche Ross report found that, "where overbuilds
have ended [because competitors have merged].., there is no evidence to suggest that, on the
average, rates increased to a point that is higher than they would have been had no overbuild
occurred." TOUCHE ROSS, REPORT ON OVERLAPPING CABLE FRANCHISE STUDY 40 (October
7, 1987) (study for Dade Co., Fla. Cable Comm'n). See also infra discussion in part V, section
B., subsection 3 (competition among cable operators results in lower consumer prices).
20. See Paul Kagan Assocs., supra note 5, at 1-2.
21. Id. Incidence of multi-franchise markets (three or more franchises) is trivial.
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• ..[and] municipalities do not grant more than one cable
franchise in any area within their jurisdiction.22
Federal case law reflects this disagreement over the existence and
extent of natural monopoly conditions. In Pacific West Cable Co. v. City
of Sacramento,2' the first suit with a full hearing on the question of
economic scarcity, the jury found that local cable television service in
Sacramento was not a natural monopoly. In Norwest Cable
Communications Partnership v. City of St. Paul,24 however, the jury found
that the St. Paul market could "support the existence of only one cable
television company."'" The verdicts in both cases were based upon
the economic findings of the juries, Sacramento finding no monopoly
conditions and opening the cable television market to non-franchised
entry, and St. Pad finding monopoly conditions and leaving franchise
barriers intact.
The possible presence of natural monopoly in the cable industry is
of great legal importance because it constitutes a possible efficiency
rationale for exclusive licensure in cable. Without the support of such
a rationale, exclusive licensure would likely be held unconstitutional.
In Sacramento, for instance, Judge Milton Schwartz observed that if the
jury had determined that the Sacramento cable distribution market
constituted a national monopoly, the verdict to open the market to all
entrants would have been considerably affected:
The jury's finding that cable television is not a natural
monopoly is particularly important in this analysis ....
If the jury had determined that cable television in the
Sacramento area was indeed a natural monopoly and that
competition would have "inevitably" resulted in a single firm
controlling the market, then the impact of a single franchise
policy on first amendment freedoms would have been much
less.26
22. Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Indust", 3 BELL J.
MGMT. & ECON. SC. 98, 111 (1972).
23. 672 F. Supp. 1322, 1328 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
24. No. 3-93 Civ. 1228 (D. Minn., Sept. 1, 1988).
25. Id. at 4.
26. Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. at 1334-35. Clearly, Judge Schwartz viewed the natural
monopoly issue as a question of overbuilding, that is, actual competition, not just potential
competition. In the question he put to the jury on the matter, he asked: "Is 'head-to-head'
competition among cable television systems unlikely to occur and endure in the Sacramento
market? In other words, is cable television a 'natural monopoly in the Sacramento market?"
The jury answered, "No." Id. at 1349.
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The question of duopolistic competition in CATV thus assumes
great policy importance. In attempting to answer this question,
economists have advanced three different theories.
II. Efficient Market Structure: Three Perspectives
In the recent economic policy debate over the franchising and
regulation of cable television, three general perspectives have surfaced
in the literature. All are aimed at estimating the magnitude of the net
advantages of the prevailing monopoly market structure. The rival
methodologies may be termed the Scale Estimate Approach, the
Franchise Efficiency Approach, and the Cost/Benefit Approach. The
findings of each methodology will be reviewed in sequence.
A. The Scale Estimate Approach
This methodology focuses on the relationship between the quantity
supplied and cost, employing econometric estimates of the scale
parameters bearing on subadditivity. Webb,"2 Noam, 2  and Owen
and Greenhalgh29 reach varying conclusions as to the evidence. Webb
finds large elasticities of scale, in the range of 4 to 10,0 which
prompts Noam to comment that "the magnitudes of the [scale]
elasticities are so vast ... as to be unpersuasive."'" The information
requirements necessary to estimate scale elasticities in an industry such
as cable are dearly substantial, thus accounting for the range of opinion
generated. Nevertheless, the estimates provided by Noam and by
Owen and Greenhalgh are closer to the mark.
Noam estimates scale elasticities for three outputs: Homes
Passed, 2 basic subscribers, and premium subscribers. The measured
27. G. WEBB, THE ECONOMICS OF CABLE TELEVISION 59 (1983).
28. Noam, Economies of Scale in Cable Television: A Multiproduct Analysis, in VIDEO MEDIA
COMPETITION 93 (1985).
29. Owen & Greenhalgh, Competitive Considerations in Cable Television Franchising,
CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 69 (1986).
30. WEBB, supra note 27, at 59. Generally, elasticities measure percentage changes in ofl
economic variable per percentage changes in another. Here, elasticity of scale is defined as
E, - %AQuan~y _ citno This is ameasure of how much output rises per a change in costs.
%Acost Nn- T
Where this statistic is greater than one, output is rising relatively faster than costs, indicatinj
that scale economies are present.
31. Noam, supra note 28, at 95.
32. "Homes Passed" refers to the number of potential subscribers whose dwellings are
physically passed by the system's cables.
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elasticity for the physical size measurement "Homes Passed" turns out
to be very small (E , - 1.020), but more significant scale economies are
found for the other two (EI-1.054 and EP-1.072). 3 Using Noam's
scale elasticities, one can calculate a benchmark "overbuild cost
penalty"3 4 by reducing basic and pay subscribership to 60 percent of
industry means,3 5 while leaving Homes Passed at mean size. This
produces a unit cost penalty of about seven percent. Noam, however,
characterizes local cable distribution as a natural monopoly market due
to a distinct criterion: economies of scope." Total elasticity of scale
(= 1.096) is of greater magnitude than each of the individual measures,
due to the interaction of scale economies. 7
Owen and Greenhalgh find unit cost penalties resulting from an
overbuild to be higher, amounting to about fourteen percent for a
typical system. 8 However, they conclude that while "this is hardly
negligible, it is within the range of monopoly markups that might be
expected in the absence of competition or effective regulation."9
Interestingly, Noam and Owen and Greenhalgh crisscross in their
empirical findings and policy conclusions. Noam finds smaller scale
elasticities, yet leans towards a policy based upon monopoly market
structure, a policy which Owen and Greenhalgh specifically avoid.40
33. Noam, supra note 28, at 106.
34. "Overbuild cost penalty" is defined as the increase in unit costs experienced as a result
of having two firms produce for a given market versus one firm.
35. Price competition and x-effiaency factors would tend to expand either duopolist's
output beyond 50% of a comparable monopolist's. It appears reasonable to calculate the
duopolist's unit costs not simply by halving monopoly output but by allowing for some (here,
20%) increase in output. X-efficiency entails the minimization of cost. This differs from so-
called allocative efficiency, in which cost and demand conditions are held constant. There,
competitive behavior involves the expansion of production until price equals marginal cost.
Here, x-efficiency focuses on the competitive margin of lowering the cost curve itself This
concept, then, incorporates the dynamic process by which cost structures come into being over
time, as opposed to the static view of the allocative efficiency concept, where cost conditions and
technology are taken as given. See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 18 (1968).
36. Noam, supra note 28, at 114-15. Scope economies are present to the degree a
collection of product outputs can be produced jointly at lower unit cost than separately, and
total elasticity of scale is the proportional response of multiple outputs per a proportional
increase in scale. When scope economies are present, total elasticity of scale exceeds the
weighted average of product-specific scale elasticities. See W. BAUMOLJ. PANZAR & R. WILUG,
CONTESTABLE MARMTS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSrRY STuCURE 73-74 (1982).
37. Noam, supra note 28, at 106.
38. See Owen & Greenhalgh, supra note 29, at 76.
39. Id.
40. Noam, supra note 28, at 112-25; Owen & Greenhalgh, supra note 29, at 77-78.
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The ironic disparity between the conclusions reached by Noam and
by Owen and Greenhalgh points to the weakness of the scale estimate
approach. No bright line test exists that dearly identifies incontestable
natural monopoly market structures.41 Similarly, no reliable estimate
of the costs, as well as effectiveness, of any selected regulatory scheme
has been developed. Although a quantifiable test for the existence of
subadditivity is available,' this test leaves the policy issue unanswered,
for the cost increases from rivalry may be offset by the productive and
allocative efficiency gains associated with competition. The analysis is
complicated further by administrative and rent-seeking costs4
Hence, scale elasticities do not permit the analytical and institutional
richness that an analysis must have to provide a full understanding of
the costs and benefits associated with a change from monopoly
franchise to duopolistic competition."
B. The Franchise Efficiency Approach
The Franchise Efficiency Approach looks to the franchise regime
itself as the appropriate unit of study. By analyzing the behavior and
effect of regulators, the efficiency issues associated with duopolistic
versus monopolistic regimes are placed in a more appropriate public
policy context. Zupan45 has found franchising to add significantly to
total costs, thus reducing welfare. Although this study also found that
prices were significantly lower under municipal franchising regimes,
subsequent federal price-deregulation46 has eliminated any potential
41. For example, does 14%, Owen & Greenhalgh's calculation of unit cost penalties
resulting from an overbuild, see supra note 29, at 76, imply natural monopoly, duopoly,
oligopoly, or just imperfect competition?
42. See supra note 15.
43. The literature typically refers to investments in procuring government franchises as
rent-seeking costs, in that new output is not created as a result of the expenditures, but instead
is transferred from some other potential recipient. This is wasteful, as resources are consumed
while output is not increased for the system as a whole.
44. This argument is not meant to demean the analysts. They have produced useful
information, but the central issues are inherently elusive and call for a more complex welfare
analysis.
45. Zupan, The Efficacy of Franchise Bidding Schemes in the Case of Cable Tdevision: Some
Systematic Evidence, 32 J. L & ECON. 401 (1989).
46. In the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, § 2,47 U.S.C. § 543 (Supp. V 1987),
Congress eliminated local government rate controls over basic cable services as of December
29, 1986, in all communities where "effective competition" was found to exist by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). In April 1985, the FCC issued its conclusion that effective
competition existed whenever three B-grade off-air TV station contours reached the cable
system's area. See Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable Communication Policy Act
of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,650-51 (1985) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.33 (1988)). This
effectively deregulated 97% of all U.S. cable franchises. See UNiTM STATES GENERAL
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offset in the form of price restraint to the cost increases associated with
franchising. In contrast to Zupan, Hazlett found that local price
controls were not used to enhance consumer welfare, even prior to the
era of federal deregulation, but were used primarily as leverage by
governments to enforce cross-subsidy agreements between firms and
franchisers.47 In the absence of price controls, cable firms could more
easily renege on franchise agreements; the periodic requests for rate
hikes were seen as a low-cost enforcement tool for municipalities. 48
In a previous artide,49 Hazlett reviewed industry litigation and found
local governments acting purposefully to foreclose competitive
challenges to cable, thus revealing a pro-monopoly, anti-consumer
intent. In an econometric test of this hypothesis," Beutel discovered
that cities were more likely to award franchises to firms with high
output prices and concluded that political agents acted to maximize
politically-appropriable rents, not welfare."
C. The Cost/Benefit Approach
Smiley52 has offered a third analytical perspective, one particularly
appealing to economists, which seeks to assess the relative welfare
trade-offs resulting from direct cable competition. The benefits of such
competition include increased consumer choice stemming from the
introduction of an imperfect substitute, and the reduction of prices
from monopolistic to duopolistic levels, assuming a regime of laissez-
faire pricing. Price reductions improve welfare by allowing fuller
satisfaction of the demand curve lying above the marginal cost curve,
but do not take into account transfers to consumers from the
incumbent, price-lowering monopolist. The analysis calculates the cost
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL SURVEY OF CABLE TELEVISION RATES AND SERVICES 4 (August
1989). In a recent ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, this
deregulation--challenged by the National League of Cities among others-was upheld. See
ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam), cert. denied sub. nomn. Connecticut
v. FCC, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
47. See T. Hazlett, The Demand to Regulate Franchise Monopoly: Evidence From CATV
Rate Deregulation in California, at 16-18 (Sept. 1989) (forthcoming in J. ECON. INQUIRY).
48. Instead of using periodic requests for rate hikes as a tool to lower effective prices,
municipalities employed such requests to police rent transfer bargains.
49. See Hazlett, Competition v. Franchise Monopoly in Cable Television, 4 CONTEMP. POL'Y
ISSUES 80 (1986) [hereinafter Competition v. Franchise Monopoly].
50. See P. Beutel, Uncovering Cities' Selection Criteria in Monopoly Franchising: The Case
of Cable Television (July 1987) (available, Dep't Econ., Miami U., Oxford, Ohio).
51. Id. at 16-17. Beutel's sample was from the pre-deregulation era when rates were price-
controlled locally.
52. A. SMILEY, ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DIRrI" COMPETITION
AMONG CABLE TELEVISION SYSTEMS (FAG Paper No. 86-9, June 5, 1989).
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of direct competition as the increase in expense associated with dual
suppliers. This production inefficiency flows from imposing a quasi-
competitive structure on a presumably subadditive industry cost
curve.
53
Smiley hypothesizes a plausible demand curve, applies a game-
theoretic approach to approximate the likely price-reduction benefits
of duopoly, and deduces duplication cost penalties from construction
and operating costs suggested by informed industry sources. He then
performs a simulation on benchmark cases for a typical cable system,
finding that: (a) a franchise monopoly market structure produces less
total welfare than either a simultaneous dual entry or a partial
sequential entry scenario, while (b) a fully sequential overbuild54 will
fail to materialize in view of the realization of negative profits by the
second entrant. As expected, the monopoly scenario produces less
consumer surplus than either of the duopoly outcomes, while
minimizing supply costs. Moreover, under Smiley's assumption of
nondiscriminatory pricing, a complete overbuild is unnecessary to
produce positive welfare effects because a partial overbuild also
produces price reductions; the simultaneous entry scenario predicts an
overbuild of only 9 percent of the market, yet the overbuild is
accompanied by a price reduction of 7.62 percent, and a summed
penetration 55 increase of 14.03 percent."
Sensitivity analysis reveals that the net welfare effects of duopoly are
widely variable: "the degree of overbuilding is highly sensitive to
market conditions and... varies inversely with demand elasticity and
costs."5 7 Yet, with a variety of assumptions, "under mandatory rate
deregulation, it is reasonable to conclude that overbuild competition
has a potentially significant welfare-enhancing role and that
municipalities may opt for overbuilding more often than in the
past."58
53. This approach can be thought of as derivative from the scale economies analysis but
distinct in that it explicitly considers both sides of the market.
54. A fully sequential overbuild is realized when the first firm to enter has an absolute first
mover advantage.
55. Penetration = numbers of subscribers / numbers of homes passed by cable.
56. A. ShULEY, supra note 52, at 24.
57. Id. at 32.
58. Id. at 35.
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Table 159
Smiley's Benchmark Scenarios:
Monopoly v. Three Varieties of Duopoly
Franchise Simultaneous Sequential Partial
Monopoly Entry Entry' Sequential
Entry
ProfitsCIn) $184,913 $71,365 $77,300 $84,033
Profith(nO,) n.a. 71,365 - 3,957 30,909
Consumer
Surplus (CS) 178,416 228,968 339,838 284,730
Welfare (W) 363,329 371,698 413,181 399,671
'Negative profit for second firm compels single entrant solution, as shown
in Column 1.
III. Franchisers as Maximizing Agents: A Public Choice Model
Smiley's framework is well-crafted to enable one to break out and
quantify the trade-offs involved in monopoly versus duopoly market
structure in a comparative statics exercise. Indeed, it encompasses the
econometric estimation of duplication cost penalties in the scale
elasticity approach, and, at least in form, frames the problem in terms
of the welfare implications of the municipal decision to permit free
entry. But the clarity of Smiley's framework makes more apparent
59. Id. at 24.
60. In this table and the next section,
W = welfare
* CS = consumer surplus
x = profits
• P, q, AC, MC = price, quantity, average unit cost, and marginal unit cost,
respectively
N = number of market competitors
Subscript d, subscript m refer to duopoly or monopoly market structure (also
used as superscripts, where necessary)
Subscript I refers to incumbent or first mover; subscript 2 to second entrant
Vol. 7: 65, 1990
Competition in CATV
three separate problems not addressed by using such a cost/benefit
calculus to prescribe policy. First, the framework lacks any plausible
public choice model of the municipal decision to award cable
franchises. Second, it fails to allow profit-maximizing firms to
internalize rationally the costs of duplication. Since firms can limit
duplication costs through merger, limit pricing, etc., these costs should
not be treated as externalities in the same sense as consumer surplus
is seen as an exogenous benefit in the policy calculus. Third, such a
calculus treats some sunk costs and simple pecuniary losses as marginal
social costs. We deal with these problems in inverse order.
A. Sunk Costs and Simple Pecuniary Losses
If, following Smiley, the welfare question is viewed in traditional
terms, net social benefits (W) are calculated as the sum of consumer
surplus (CS) and industry profits:
W = CS+Cl 1
where ic = P1q1 - AC1q1 and n2 = P2q2 - AC2q2. Traditional economic
analysis attempts to judge the effects of duopoly versus monopoly, i.e.,
to determine if the change in welfare, stemming from an increase from
AW
1 to 2 in the number of suppliers, is non-negative: W > 0.
Consumer surplus must rise as entry takes place because of reduced
prices and expanded output to consumers. 1 Also, because firms do
not enter markets when they anticipate that such entry will lower their
profits, where entry is partially or wholly sequential, the profits of Firm
2 will be greater or equal to zero, i.e., x2 _ 0. Hence, total welfare (W)
can only be diminished if an increase in the number of entrants (N)
causes a dominating fall in the profits of the incumbent firm (nr) which
outweighs the resulting increase in consumer surplus (CS) and the
increase in the profitability of entering firms, i.e.,. 'I,> d + CS as
N goes from 1 to 2.62 This merely says that duopoly lowers welfare
61. Consumer surplus is a function of the number of suppliers, i.e., CS = f(N). Thus, the
change in consumer surplus as the number of suppliers increases must be positive, i.e.,
ACS , 0.
AN62. In that 7 = 0 when N = 1, the change in Firm 2's profits due to entry is sim-
ply - A-.AN
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only if the incumbent's loss in profitability from competition outweighs
the gains to consumers and to the new entrant. Decreases in 7c (the
profit of the incumbent) attributable to declining revenues
(A (ll) < 0), can be caused only by either a decline in P, (the price
charged by the incumbent), in which case welfare increases,63 or a
decline in q, (the quantity sold by the incumbent) as consumers shift to
a preferred alternative. In terms of social welfare, both represent
positive sum transactions.
Welfare declines only if the entry of Firm 2 raises the unit costs of
serving those customers that a monopolist could alternatively serve
without the duplication cost penalty. Graphically, we portray the
typical case in Figure 1, where q. = monopoly output and qd =
duopoly output. Consumers gain PmMGPd from duopolistic
competition (where AC < Pd < P., consistent with plausible duopoly
equilibrium assumptions), while the monopoly producer loses (C) = (PI
- ACm)qm. The entire quantity (PI - ACm)qm is included in Smiley's
analysis as a welfare loss, though, while just the triangle (A), and the
profits of the second firm that are not transferred from the incumbent,
are counted as efficiency gains. Smiley calculates the net benefit
derived from competition as:
Wd - Wm = (A) + (B) - (C).
Smiley endorses multiple entry whenever this magnitude exceeds zero.
In other words, raising the per unit total costs of an incumbent
results in lost rents or quasi-rents, but is not properly counted as a cost
of entry. It may involve a pecuniary loss, as the market value of the
sunk capital is reduced. However, such losses generally have not been
included as social costs:
The person who loses wealth via transfer of goods or the
reduction of their exchange value is suffering a real loss of
wealth, but not a cost. That loss is different in principle, in kind,
and in fact from a cost. From the private point of view both
sources of loss of wealth are "bad" for him. Both are losses of
opportunities to him, though only a cost is a loss to the community
63. This assumes P > MC, a necessary condition for a profitable unregulated monopolist
not practicing perfect price discrimination. However, even with a perfectly discriminating
monopolist, welfare does not decline with price reductions; consumer surplus gains precisely
offset producer surplus losses.
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as a whole. What he loses in the pure price revaluation case,
someone else gains."
Hence, given a municipality which already has a monopoly supplier
and has no credibility problem,65 the procedure of summing
consumer surplus and supplier profits is flawed by allowing a non-cost
item to lower ;j and, hence, W.
B. Cost Minimization Strategies of Entering Firms
In the simultaneous entry case, all costs are marginal and pre-entry.
This raises the second criticism of the traditional cost benefit analysis.
Rational entrants are likely to internalize and minimize duplication of
capital costs as efficiently on average as franchising. Moreover,
entering firms have several minimizing strategies available to them such
as merging with competitors or using sustainable pricing.' In the
latter, one firm6 7 would credibly establish a long-run price (PI), which
realizes all scale economies, but does not compromise the consumer
surplus gains associated with duopolistic competition. The
establishment of a long-run price (P) would serve to deter Firm 2.
However, the incentive to set prices below monopoly levels (Pm) arises
only when a municipality pursues a nonexclusive franchising policy.
C. A Public Choice Model of the Municipal Franchise Decision
Obtaining a municipal policy of nonexclusive franchising is
problematic, as our initial and most fundamental critique indicates.
Total industry profits, as Smiley shows, and as intuition dictates, are
maximized in the exclusive franchise scenario. A sole franchise has
more than twice the value of either of two competitive franchises.
Assuming that a municipality has a dual entry policy-a policy shown
64. A. Alchian, Cost, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1968), reprinted in
ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 301, 331 (1977) (emphasis in original).
65. A monopolist's fixed investment may become important, instead, for analyzing the
long-term credibility of commitments undertaken by the municipality. See infra text
accompanying note 92.
66. See generay F. SCHERER INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTIURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 232-52 (1980).
67. The more efficient firm would have a lower cost of pre-emption, although the analysis
abstracts from cost differences. Pre-emption is used here generically as any action undertaken
by an incumbent or would-be incumbent to keep a rival from entering the market. In many
cases, pre-emptive investments may be outlays undertaken to raise rivals' costs. However, the
action may include proconsumer behavior such as the limit pricing strategy discussed in the
text. See id.
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to be normatively optimal across a wide range of cases under the
Smiley analysis---the rents associated with retaining a franchise
monopoly are inevitably greater, assuming homogeneous firms, than
the potential profits available to an entrant. As a result of this rent
asymmetry between monopolies and duopolies, in either the
simultaneous entry or sequential entry case, the incumbent/potential
monopolist can outbid any equally efficient potential entrant in the
political marketplace.
The public choice literature predicts that auctions for benefits
distributed by the political process will produce a stable equilibrium
when organized coalitions bid for the rents associated with a given
policy regime.6s This result is clarified by contrasting the two
inequalities that embody the economic welfare analysis and the public
choice calculus:
The Normative Social Welfare Analysis Inequality: Is A + B +
CST > x' - n'? This asks whether the consumer surplus
allocative efficiency gain (A), and the gain transferred from the
monopolist to consumers (CST), plus the profits gained by the
entering firm (B), are greater or lesser than the loss in profits
experienced by the incumbent monopolist (Firm 1) as the
industry moves from monopoly to duopoly (nt' - ict), and
The Positive Public Choice Analysis Inequality:
Is 42 > n * - n' ?" This indicates that whether the second firm
will be allowed to enter depends upon whether the profit the
second firm will make (;i), discounted by a factor (8) to take into
account the uncertainty that the firm, through competition, will
actually achieve that profit, exceeds the loss to the incumbent
monopolist (ic*' - 7).
68. See Becker, A Teoy of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influemce, 98 Q.J.
ECON. 371 (1983).
69. The discount factor (8), where I 8 2! 0, assumes that making profit in a competitive
situation involves risk. In Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. 1322
(E.D. Cal. 1987), fbr example, the entrant that filed suit and won the case by obtaining a ruling
that franchise monopoly was unconstitutional, was not even the first to enter the post-monopoly
cable market (see discussion part V. section B, infra). This occurred because the actual policy
decision faced by municipal authorities is monopoly versus free entry, not monopoly versus
duopoly; hence, the entering duopolist has acquired no special claim in return for resources
expended in obtaining permission to enter.
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Consumers are not likely to be able to organize themselves so as to
contract collectively for CATV services or, alternatively, to effectively
monitor their political agents who arrange such contracts. The
transactions costs associated with informing and organizing consumers
are likely to be high in cable TV markets. Indeed, this market failure
forms the basis of the natural monopoly problem. ° As a result, the
potential gains to consumers--the allocative efficiency gains and other
benefits that could be transferred to consumers by the monopolist-are
not included in the public choice analysis (A + CST = 0). Consumer
demand is zero-weighted.
In a positive sense, then, policymakers would be expected to weigh
the size of entrant profits, discounted by the inherent nonexclusivity
associated with the multiple entry right, against the loss inflicted on an
incumbent or potential incumbent by a second firm entry. As noted,
industry profits are, ceteris paribus, greatest under monopoly. Thus,
even if an equally efficient entrant captures one-half of industry profits
under duopoly, its gain would necessarily be smaller than the resultant
incumbent loss. That is, the inequality
d > d
1 1 2
would always hold. 1 Only exceptional profits for a superior entrant
or asymmetric expectations, both violations of homogeneity
assumptions, 72 would create incentives for a municipality to permit
entry. Entry will be deterred not because of natural monopoly
conditions, but because municipal franchisers do not adequately
consider consumer interests.7"
70. See Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968); Goldberg, Regulation
and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 426 (1976); Sexton & Sexton,
Cooperatives as Entrants, 18 RANDJ. ECON. 581 (1987); Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural
Monopolies-n General and With Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Scl. 73 (1976).
71. If the incumbent monopolist starts with profits m n., and entry by a second firm
reduces it to profits = aid, where cc = proportion of total duopoly profits (or "share of the
market") earned by Firm I after the entry by Firm 2, then I assert: e" - at0 > 8(I-)ie
whenever ' > nd. This is dearly true for N > 2 as well.
72. We have assumed throughout, as is customary, that all firms have access to the same
technology and managerial talent and hence are homogeneous. Allowing newer, superior
methods to be employed by entrants would obviously introduce an additional argument for an
open entry policy.
73. At an October 1987 industry seminar on overbuilding attended by the author, an
attorney for the National League of Cities, a strongly pro-franchise monopoly association,
questioned the viability of overbuilding on the grounds that entrants would always be bought
off (via merger) by incumbents, given the fact that a monopoly system was inevitably worth
much more than the sum of competitive ones. Touche Ross makes just this point in a case
study. See supm note 19, at 34. The complaint is commonly made in trade gatherings that
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A final disequilibrium remains. When a municipality grants a
limited number of franchises, the supracompetitive returns expected to
be obtained by the grantee(s) inevitably provoke vigorous rent-seeking
competition for the franchises. As a result, the cable television market
has become notorious for the intensity and contentiousness of its
franchise battles.74 The most common municipal practice is to auction
just one cable franchise to the applicant promising the highest level of
subsidies for uneconomic services and programming," or to the
applicant with the most compelling political mix of equity owners.78
However, allowing for risk premiums and the asymmetric cost
functions of competitors," the sum of lobbying expenses undertaken
to secure a franchise will be approximately equal to the present value
of the monopoly rent stream itself. This profoundly affects Smiley's
welfare analysis by further offsetting the monopoly cost savings:
Welfare Analysis with Rent Seeking: Is A + B + CST > n - Cd -R?
where R = the discounted sum of all rent-seeking costs expended to
obtain the monopoly. Here we compare the size of the gains from
competitive entry, which accrue to consumers and the entrant, to the
loss in profits suffered by the incumbent minus the rent-seeking cost
attached to monopoly franchises. Tullock" and Posner 79 have
postulated that, given plausible assumptions (primarily risk neutrality
and homogeneous firms), R - 7 - 7cd That is, the entire rent
associated with the property right of monopoly will be spent by
franchise bidders. This result is a long-run equilibrium condition. As
long as R < r - n, the expected value of a marginal investment in
overbuilders are green-mailers, entering only to be purchased at a generous price by the
incumbent. Of course, an incumbent that buys off all comers in open entry markets will soon
be green-mailed down to zero quasi-rents. (Seen from the other side, an incumbent who
charges a sustainable price is invulnerable to green mail). The principle that a monopoly return
motivates a higher bid than does a less than monopoly return is correct; the sensible thing to
bid on, however, is an exclusive franchise, not a free entry right.
74. See Private Monopoly, supra note 13.
75. See P. Edwards, Cable Television Franchising: A Case Study of Minneapolis, Minnesota
58, 93 (1985) (unpublished manuscript available from Communications Media Center, New
York Law School).
76. Hazlett, Cabling America: Economic Forces in a Political World, in FREEDOM IN
BROADCASING 208 (C. Veljanovski ed. 1989) [hereinafter Cabling America].
77. See Rice & Ulen, Rent Seeking and Welfare Loss, 3 R.s. L & ECON. 53, 63 (1981)
(developing model of nonuniform monopoly license acquisition costs).
78. Tullock, The Wdfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967).
79. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. PoL. ECON. 807 (1975).
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securing the right would be positive and further rent seeking would
occur.
80
Ironically, the major difficulty in including monopoly cost savings
as a welfare gain, as Smiley's cost-benefit calculus does, is that such
gains are easily appropriated by the franchising authority as a political
unit, and then dissipated in the ensuing quest for private assignment.
An open-entry policy would entail no political auction and would avoid
such costs.8' Hence, in a public choice equilibrium, selecting a
monopoly franchise policy whenever
A+B + CST> Wr" d I I
is an elusive social maximum, for the policy choice is itself endogenous.
In instances where the above inequality suggests monopoly efficiency,
wasteful rent seeking of approximately R = (c- Ed) will result. The
rents saved by the monopoly franchise policy will be squandered in the
competition for obtaining and defending the franchise itself.
80. Full dissipation is not necessary in the short-run when there are limits on the entrants
to the rent-seeking competition, see Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF
THE RENT-SEEJUNG SOCIETY 97-112 (Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock eds. 1980), or when
some firms have lower costs in capturing the rents, see Flowers, Rent Seeking and Rent
Dissipation" A Critica View, 7 CATO J. 431, 437-38 (1987). Any excess profit will, however,
encourage investment to achieve such returns over the long-run until the anticipated marginal
return falls to zero. Moreover, Wenders argues that "rent-defending costs" may actually raise
R above et - ez. Wenders, On Perfect Rent Dissipation, 77 AM. EcON. REV. 457-58 (1987).
Mills, in an apt demonstration of the importance of rent dissipation in a similar market, finds
that whatever public goods zoning laws may supply, they are too easily wasted in rent seeking
to obtain transfers to increase social welfare. Mills, Is Zoning a Negative-Sum Game?, 65 LAND
ECON. 1 (1989).
81. Smiley suggests that there exist rent-seeking costs associated with open-entry in the
form of pre-emptive wiring built by firms in a race to cable neighborhoods before the entry of
competitors. See A. SMILEY, supra note 52, at 27. However, this rent seeking could be
eliminated through relaxation of antitrust limitations on gentlemen's agreements. It would be
in all rivals' interests to enter into market divisions if pre-emption led to inefficiencies. Indeed,
at least two jurisdictions (Dade County, Florida and Columbus, Ohio) have supervised such
"peace treaties" to facilitate the cabling of their cities by several firms possessing area-wide
nonexclusive franchises. See infra note 114 and accompanying text; BOOZ ALLEN, ANALYSIS OF
OVERLAPPING FRANCHISES, OVERBUILDING AND DIVIDING URBAN MARKETS IN THE CATV
INDUSTRY FOR CABLE ATLANTA, INC. AND GEORGIA CABLEVISION CORP. app. (October 9,
1979). But where such agreements turn into rigged-bid collusions to gain franchise protection,
antitrust action may result, as it did in Houston. See Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of
Houston, 735 F.2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1984).
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IV. The Policy Relevance of Duopolistic Competition with
Constrained Regulators
Duopolistic rivalry is generally analyzed by extrapolating from the
study of monopolistic cable franchises. This complicates the analysis of
competition in cable. Because the overwhelming majority of cable
systems are not overbuilt, cost studies are performed on monopoly
firms-firms that may differ systematically from duopolistic
competitors.8 2
However, analyzing the effects of competition in cable television is
easier now that local municipal authorities have few regulatory powers
over cable operators besides the power of regulating entry.8" Because
federal law now prohibits local price control, the standard cost/benefit
analysis has been simplified. The traditional economic approach
evaluates monopoly franchise regulation by weighing the social benefits
derived from controlling prices against the various costs associated with
such a regulatory regime. This approach is clearly inappropriate when
the regulators no longer control output prices. Franchise regulation
can now be analyzed as an exchange of an entry right to the chosen
monopolist for various favors, such as: contributions of cash grants to
local foundations, stock equity and consulting contracts to political
movers, and franchise fees or gifts in-kind to the franchise authority or
its appointed constituencies."
Franchising without rate controls essentially involves just the transfer
of rents. This actually promotes inefficiency because these
redistributions are not, when done legally, enacted via direct money
payments to individual decisionmakers, but are paid through public
organizations via the political process.8" The current "deregulated"
82. Primeaux found such x-efficiency differences in the electric utility industry. See
Primeaux, A Remxamination of the Monopoly Market Structure for Electric Utilities, in PROMOTING
COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETs 175 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
83. See Shepherd, Entry as a Substutefor Regulation, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 98 (1973) (arguing
that literature on entry under regulation has not taken into account scope and varieties of types
of regulation).
84. See Privte Monopoly, supra note 13, at 1403 (Table 3). Some commentators have
referred to this activity as "Rent-a-citizen." See 'Rent-a-Citizen' Controversy, Washington Post,
Sept. 28, 1980, at L3, col. 4; Free Shares of Cable TV Costs Its Users, Washington Post, Sept. 14,
1980, at Al, col. 3; see also NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DFP'T
OF COMMERCE, NTIA REPORT 88-233, VIDEO PROGRAM DISTRIBUTION AND CABLE TELEVISION:
CURRENT POLICY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 29-30 (1988) [hereinafter NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS] ("'rent-a-civic leader'").
85. For instance, the League of Women Voters has its political support purchased via a
promise of zero-priced airtime and production facilities, rather than through an explicit
monetary payment to its members.
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franchise monopoly, then, promotes wasteful rent seeking,"6
substitutes political selection for consumer selection of the monopolist
or duopolist, and freezes out newer forms of technology and innovative
organizations or delivery modes, 7 while failing to offer even a
plausible chance of welfare gains through price controls or rate-of-
return regulation. Thus, we may characterize the franchising process
as nakedly inefficient from a welfare perspective, although it does
produce benefits for municipal franchisers.88
The verdict just stated may be reached by focusing upon the limited
outcomes available. In Table 2, we consider three possible outcomes
from the policy decision to eliminate entry barriers. Because
consumers cannot be worse off than under an unregulated monopoly,
the open-entry policy scenarios present themselves as zero-cost
alternatives insofar as consumer surplus is concerned. However,
political decisionmakers sacrifice considerable benefits under the open-
entry policy. This explains why the franchising process is so valued by
political interests even when it is not in fact used to suppress price and
expand welfare, and even when it cannot be used to do so, as in today's
CATV market. Here the trade-off between a public franchising agent's
direct access to the fruits of an auction for economic rents versus the
possibility of garnering public accolades for promoting proconsumer
competition, assuming the existence of such accolades for the sake of
argument, is one in which the public interest constraint can be
discounted almost completely.8 9
86. See Tullock, supra note 78, at 231.
87. See Noam, Ptivate Sector Monopolies: The Case of Cable Television Franchises, in
PRODUCTIVITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 193,208-12 (M. Holzer & S. Nagel eds. 1984). Noam finds
such dynamic economies particularly pronounced in cable. Id.
88. This explains its overwhelming employment by municipal governments.
89. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. So. 3 (1971).
One possible benefit of open entry to political franchisers-a benefit not listed in Table
2-is the opportunity to avoid a decision between rival factions. This is the motive ascribed to
municipal governments where overlapping franchises have been issued. See BOOz ALLEN, supra
note 81. It is counter-intuitive to model individual decisionmakers as preferring less to more
on the grounds that it is difficult to make choices (and it is hence omitted in our analysis). If
elected officials encounter difficulty in selecting a franchise, as is often the case, they can
choose: (a) the highest offer, weighted to reflect all the political interests and personal tastes
of the politician; (b) ask the top choices to merge their proposals and split the equity interests;
or (c) divide the community into franchise areas, awarding exclusive franchises in each region.
After a franchise battle running several years in Minneapolis, two cable companies of equal
political clout simply decided to split the city in half, whereupon two franchises were issued;
a merger then consolidated the systems. See P. Edwards, supra note 75. at 92-93.
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Table 2
Open Entry Policy Welfare Trade-Offs (v. Monopoly Franchise)
Cost to: Benefit to:
Structure Consumers Franchising Consumers Franchising
Result Agents Agents
No Second None Rent transfers Potential entry None
Entry more difficult to may force limit
distribute as pricing, pre-
monopoly rights emptive incum-
are attenuated. bent output
expansion
Entry Which None Rent seeking Short-run price Public accolades
Ends transferred to competition, for allowing
economic output expan- competition.
marketplace sion; surviving
from the public firm likely to be
sector; com- better adapted
petition for the to consumer
franchise tastes.
eliminated.
Entry Which None Rent seeking Permanent Public accolades








The existence of a limiting case-unregulated monopoly-as the
default value in the entry decision greatly facilitates our analysis.
There is no confusion regarding the sign of the first derivatives as we
go from a regime of protected monopoly to one of actual or potential
duopoly: prices will fall and outputs will expand. Hence, the analysis
of what actually happens post-entry need not be quantified to arrive at
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a conclusion regarding the direction of consumer surplus effects. Entry
cannot hurt; at worst, it will leave consumers unaffected. 90
The constraints upon local regulators, particularly those which limit
their inability to set rates, also serve to clarify and test a possible
explanation for exclusive cable franchising: the efficient long-term
contract paradigm. By creating certain economies in production and
distribution, exclusivity could be used to strike a bargain between
potential monopolists and franchising bodies that act as agents for
consumers. 91 Under this scenario, a property right to monopoly
could well be in the global interests of consumers even if, ex post, it
generated net costs Oust as it may behoove one to abide by the terms
of a contract even if a particular paradigm is no longer in one's narrow
financial interest). Once a deal has been struck, abandoning it for a
better option may be seen as opportunistic, and an agent's credibility
in arranging bargains in future periods may be damaged.92
This situation is analogous to business dealings where exclusive
territories are quite often protected by manufacturers for distributors
so as to rationalize marketing systems. What must be present in this
type of relationship, however, is a bona fide deal: consideration is
required on both sides of the contract. Monopoly rights should not be
tendered for a zero price. This is why the naked monopoly franchise
scheme now predominant in municipalities fails to fit the efficient
contract enforcement paradigm.
93
90. A recent study of cable franchising by the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) echoes this analysis. See NATIONAL TELCOMMUNICATIONS,
supra note 84. In the study, the first extensive appraisal of cable regulatory policy by the
federal government in fourteen years, the NTIA concluded:
The common occurrence ofexclusive cable franchises does not serve the public interest.
The franchising process has seriously impeded entry by competitors and imposes
substantial costs on franchisees, cable subscribers, and the public. Municipalities could,
instead, encourage competitive cable operators to service a franchise area which would
result in greater choice, better service, and lower prices to consumers. In fact, many
of the "market power" problems and issues we face today are direct outgrowths of a
franchising process that has, and continues to, erect [sic] large entry barriers.
Id. at i.
91. See Goldberg, supra note 70; Williamson, supra note 70.
92. The whole idea of a patent, for example, is to protect future period creative activity
by ensuring monopoly returns in the present period.
93. Another factor preventing the occurrence of an efficient contract enforcement scenario
is that it is often illegal under state law, or of questionable legality under antitrust law, to
explicitly award exclusive franchises. Hence, city governments claim that issuing a single,
nominally "non-exdusive" franchise does not constitute the creation of a legal monopoly.
Tucson Mayor Thomas Volgy, the Chairman of the National League of Cities Transportation
and Telecommunications Steering Committee, recently noted that "cities don't award exclusive
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Consumers could conceivably receive consideration for
countenancing monopoly in two basic ways: (1) exclusivity might
promote cable investment where none would otherwise be forthcoming;
or (2) consumers could arrange to share the monopolist's scale
economies in the form of lower prices. For the first condition to
obtain, the service in question would have to evince some amortization
difficulty (as when an idea without patent protection is copied). No
such riskiness accompanies cable investments, which are immediately
capitalized at several times investment book value," and which are
readily undertaken in open-entry jurisdictions.95  Indeed, the
franchise process has tended to delay, rather than to promote,
proconsumer investments.
As for granting monopoly rights to receive lower prices, such an
opportunity for municipalities no longer exists. Some might argue on
fairness grounds that the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,
which deregulated rates as of December 29, 1986, constituted an
exogenous shock and should not be used opportunistically by
municipalities as a justification for allowing new entry. However, the
National Cable Television Association, the trade association of the cable
industry, lobbied for years to secure passage of the measure." Hence,
it is the cable operators who have behaved opportunistically vis-a-vis
the municipal franchising authorities with respect to the regime switch.
Further evidence that the primary reasons for the existence of cable
franchise monopolies are the benefits they provide to local franchising
authorities is provided by the continued existence of monopoly
franchises even after the decontrol of rates imposed by the Cable
Communications Policy Act. Municipalities are not generally
abandoning their now naked (i.e., lacking rate-regulation) franchise
monopolies. As hundreds of franchises come up for renewal each year,
the new policy regime of rate deregulation should be reflected in the
elimination of franchise monopoly, of the assumed quid Pro quo. The
old arrangement's purported quo of rate control has been removed, yet
the quid of franchise monopoly remains.
It is not a mystery as to why. The cable franchise arrangement lacks
consideration for consumers, but not for franchising authorities. In a
franchises ... but are faced with cable operators who choose for economic reasons not to
overbuild incumbent operators" (paraphrase of Volgy, Comm. Daily, June 16, 1988, at 2).
Exdusivity is maintained informally, through a franchising process that simply presents
prohibitively costly impediments to second entrants. See NATIONAL TELFCOMMUNICATIONS,
supra note 84, at 20 n.55.
94. See infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
95. See Pvivate Monopoly, supra note 13, at 1372 n.130.
96. Cities Fight Move to Curb Local Cable TVRegulation, NATLJ.. May 9, 1981. at 1599-1600.
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classic principal/agent problem, political actors maximize influence,
power, or wealth by creating rent-seeking competitions between rival
monopoly daimants.97 A for-profit manufacturer can reliably identify
and terminate exclusive franchises created by regional or division
executives who negotiate away company interests for personal gain, and
hence the principal/agent problem does not dominate the gains possible
in a private market exclusivity exchange. Since the costs to cable
consumers of similarly disciplining their cable franchise agents, i.e.,
their local politicians, are far higher, the cable television market has
given way to uncompensated monopoly creation.
V. Two Case Studies
The existence of duopoly in the cable industry demonstrates the
economic and public choice issues surrounding cable competition. A
full examination of all overbuilds has not been performed yet, although
various treatments offer useful information. In a previous study I
found that multiple franchise systems on average offered a package
consisting of basic channels and one premium channel at $1.82 per
month per subscriber lower than a monopoly franchise system.98
Webbink finds the difference somewhat less, $1.18, but similarly
significant and in the same direction.99 Recent data on nineteen
private overbuilt competitors, reveals that unweighted prices are nearly
23.5 percent below those of monopolistic firms for a typical
Basic+HBO package.1"' Although this spread is highly significant
statistically, it is unadjusted for other possible characteristic differences
between the samples. Moreover, the sample is biased, including some
of the most aggressively competitive overbuilt markets.
Rather than reconstruct or extend such monopoly/duopoly studies
herein, I shall examine two particular duopolistic markets. Each one
is interesting as a cutting edge example of current overbuilds where
some entry has been achieved, more is being sought, and political
conflict has joined economic rivalry, or vice versa, as an integral
element of the competitive struggle, thereby revealing the views of the
97. See Beutel, supra note 50; CablingAmerica, supra note 76, at 203; Competition v. Franchise
Monopoly, supra note 49; Private Monopoly, supra note 13; Zupan, supra note 45; NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 84, at 22-31.
98. Competition v. Franchise Monopoly, supra note 49, at 91.
99. D. Webbink, The impact of Regulation and Competition on Cable TV Service Prices,
Channels and Pay Tiers (May 2, 1985) (unpublished manuscript, Bureau of Econ., Fed. Trade
Comm'n).
100. Cabling America, supra note 76, at 219.
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parties involved as to the economic impacts of the various policies at
issue.
This method of analysis is selective, and owes much to the judgment
of the author."1 Why should two particular markets be of interest
in a systematic analysis intended to be applicable to thousands of cable
TV markets? In a similar context, however, Oliver Williamson has
argued that:
Considering the primitive state of comparative institutional
analysis, more than abstract study is needed. Microanalytic
examination of a number of individual cases will also be
instructive. Among the cases that might by selected for
examination, the "study of extreme instances often provides
important leads to the essentials of the situation."'0 2
Williamson also cites the observation of A. A. Walters and P. T Bauer
that "the complexity, instability, and local variation of many economic
phenomena imply that the establishment of understanding of
relationships requires that analysis . . ." must often extend beyond
statistical information to direct observation and use of primary
sources.
103
Despite the difficulties involved in quantifying and interpreting
duopolistic market results, estimations of the possible results of
overbuilding have consistently influenced the intuition, and hence
conclusions, of cable market analysts. For example, Eli Noam's translog
cost function, estimated on a data set consisting of 4,800 cable systems,
produced ambiguous empirical evidence, yet Noam nonetheless
surmised:
Beyond the theoretical arguments, there is also the reality of
competitive entry, or rather the lack thereof. In practice there
are no second entrants, apart from minor cream skimming
instances. Competitive cable television services ... exist in less
than 50 franchises out of 4,800 and are usually caused by
disputes about the scope of the initial franchise award .... The
101. It also takes a moving target as its subject matter. The market facts discussed in this
Article were the result of research conducted in 1987-88. While the dynamics of the
marketplace may quickly render the particulars of any snapshot analysis obsolete, the economic
forces at work are likely to be operative over broad categories of phenomena.
102. Williamson, supra note 70, at 75 (quoting BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES SUBPANEL,
PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, STRENGTHENING THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
(1962)).
103. Id. at 101-02.
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rivalry among cable operators is thus primarily for the right of
first entry"04
In this methodological spirit I shall present the facts surrounding
two instances of ongoing duopolistic competition as case studies.105
A. Duopolistic Competition in Florida
The most aggressive overbuilder in the country is Telesat
Cablevision, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the multi-billion dollar
firm, Florida Power and Light Group Capital (the FPL Group). Telesat
began in 1981 as a private cable firm providing Satellite Master
Antenna (SMATV) service to multiple dwelling units (MDUs) located
solely on private property. In 1985, Telesat was purchased by the FPL
Group and, in 1986, began a campaign to secure local cable franchises
with which to compete against established CATV operators. 06
Telesat currently holds 20 such permits and serves approximately
55,000 subscribers. 107
1. Orange County, Florida
In Orange County, Florida, which includes the city of Orlando,
Telesat has secured a county-wide franchise permitting competition in
all unincorporated areas. In the spring of 1987, Telesat approached
overbuilt subscribers in at least eight areas of the County. The areas
were served by two spatially separated companies, Cablevision
Industries and Cablevision of Central Florida. By September 23, 1987,
Telesat, the entrant, had passed 10,000 homes with cable in overbuilt
areas, and had signed up 4,000 subscribers in these homes, a
penetration of 40 percent. Just as impressive, the pay-to-basic ratio
began at 1.07, assuring average monthly revenues per subscriber in the
healthy $25-30 range. 08
104. Noam, supra note 28, at 114.
105. A listing of markets where such competitive activity has occurred is contained in Paul
Kagan Assocs., Pmding Overbuild Francising Activity, CABLE TELEV ISION FRANCHISING, Oct. 31,
1989, at 1-4 (Supp.).
106. It is not necessary to obtain a franchise to transmit through a satellite dish or cable
located solely on private property. A franchise is required to lay cable across public property,
such as city streets. Thus, securing a franchise was necessary to enable Telesat to extend its
cable from private property to other private property across city streets.
107. Kriz, Cable's Comeuppance, NA'L J., Mar. 26, 1988, at 807; Telephone interview with
Richard Shore, Vice President and Controller, Telesat Cablevision, Inc. (Feb. 7, 1990).
108. Revenues from remote converter rentals, additional outlets, and advertising must be
added to basic and premium prices in calculating revenues.
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Table 3
Orange Co., Fla. Overbuild Summary: Early 1988
Basic 1st Pay No. of No. of
Rate Rate Channels Pay Density
Subs (S/mo.) ($/mo.) on Basic Channels Install (HP/mi)
Telesat 5,000 9.95 9.95 40 6 Free' n.a.
25.00t
Cablevision
Ind. n.a. 14.45 11.95 27 4 30.00
Cablevision Freel
Ind.* n.a. 7.25 7.50 27 4 30.00t n.a.
Cablevision
C.F. n.a. 12.95 11.95 33 4 27.83 90.1**
Cablevision
C.E* n.a. 6.50 6.50 33 4 n.a.
*Free during initial subscriber campaigns and subsequent promotions.
tin overbuilt areas.
"Source: See Broadcasting Cablecasting, Yearbook 1987 at D-55.
One explanation for Telesat's initial overbuilding success is that
Telesat charged significantly less while offering significantly more
channels than did the incumbents. Interestingly, the post-entry pricing
reactions of the two original suppliers have been dramatic. Cablevision
of Central Florida has reduced basic prices from $12.95 to $6.50 in
duopoly areas, with pay services similarly cut." 9  Cablevision
Industries has slashed its basic rates in half, precisely in those regions
where it is overbuilt. These strategies have not deterred Telesat
fromcontinuing to overbuild in either original supplier's service area,
for the strategies have not prevented consumers from switching to
Telesat because of its reputation, its quality programmihg, or for other
reasons. The significance of Telesat's success in Orange County is
enhanced by the fact that Telesat is overbuilding the modern cable
systems of its competitors in an average density market of 91.3
109. Dukes, Overbuild War Continues on Two Florida Battlegrounds, MULTICHANNEL NEWS,
Oct. 19, 1987.
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HP/mile, compared to a U.S. average of about 94 HP/mile," ° and in
a market where off-air broadcast television is amply supplied."'
Telesat's success under these conditions sheds doubt on the claims of
some analysts that duopoly would only be successful under very
favorable market conditions.
2. Riviera Beach, Florida
In Riviera Beach, Florida, Telesat serves 700 customers on Singer
Island, a high-density beachfront featuring high-rise condos,
apartments, and hotels. With 2.47 miles of cable, Telesat passes some
3,000 housing units. Ongoing franchise litigation has prevented
Telesat from actively marketing its product to attract more customers
from this number."'
Despite the uncertain status of its municipal franchise, the impact of
Telesat's entry in Riviera Beach is dear. The incumbent cable
provider, Comcast, served this market before Telesat's entry with an
old 12-channel cable system priced at $8.40 per month for basic.
Telesat, entering originally as an SMATV supplier, offered to wire the
high rises of Riviera Beach on a bulk-rate basis, supplying 26 channels
of basic to all units for a price of $5.75, and sending just one bill to the
condo association or owner, thereby achieving a penetration of
100 percent. Other services were provided, including a message board
channel for each building to program with building and community
news via teletype and, in one case, an emergency override message
system with which to inform residents of faulty fire alarms, which had
plagued the building. The incumbent operator, Comcast, has now
upgraded its system capacity and is pricing competitively; it has also
joined the City in a lawsuit to impose a universal service stipulation on
all cable franchises, requiring that every home be offered service if any
home is to be offered service." 3
110. PAUL KAGAN Assocs., CABLE TELEVISION FINANCIAL DATA FACTBOOK 55 (June 1987).
"HP/mile" signifies "homes passed per mile," or the average number of potential subscribers
passed by each mile of the system's cable.
111. High density of housing units and a lack of off-air television were explicitly identified
as the determinative characteristics of a viable duopoly market structure by Dr. Samuel Book,
author of the Malarkey-Taylor overbuild report. Freeman, Study Finds Profits Elusive When Two
System Overbuild, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, April 13, 1987, at 17.
112. Telephone interview with Richard Shore, Vice President and Controller, Telesat
Cablevision, Inc. (Feb. 7, 1990).
113. Telesat v. Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Riviera Beach, No. 87 Civ. 8207 (S.D. Fla. filed
Mar. 23, 1987); Telesat v. Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Riviera Beach, No. 87 Civ. 8208 (S.D. Fla.
filed Mar. 23, 1987). Telephone Interview with Richard Shore, Vice President and Controller,
Telesat Cablevision, Inc. (Feb. 7, 1990).
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3. Dade County, Florida
In Dade County, Florida, which includes the city of Miami, an
intense political battle arose in 1987 among four incumbent cable firms,
each serving essentially non-overlapping territories, and the competitive
entrant, Telesat. The County had adopted an open-entry policy in
1978, and subsequently had issued four county-wide franchises. But,
according to the County's top cable official,114 a year and half of
confusion ensued, during which just 2,000 subscribers were connected,
as the firms attempted to string cable in a preemptory fashion, staking
claims around presumably exclusive turf. At the behest of the four
firms, the County then sponsored a gentlemen's agreement, wherein
each franchise was given a specific sub-county territory to wire over five
years. Upon cabling 80 percent of said region, a franchisee could then
request County permission to jump into a rival's area. The
presumption was that permission would be granted, given the pro-
competitive policy."'
For the most part, wiring then proceeded smoothly, with each firm
operating only within its own area. In 1982 and 1983, the most
aggressive of the four firms, Americable, obtained permission to cable
unbuilt portions of two neighboring franchises. Both portions were
wired, although in the second only MDU's were cabled, leaving out
low-density areas of West Dade. The selective entries made by
Americable impelled the other franchisees to achieve their 100 percent
"build-out" performance in much less than five years. "[E]veryone was
afraid of big bad Americable coming in and taking their place.""'
Nonetheless, three other overbuilds have emerged, one in the
County's jurisdiction, and two in incorporated cities. In 1978, a
franchise was issued to Hart-Hankes to cable South Miami, but no
building occurred. The City asked Americable to enter in 1981, at
which time Hart-Hankes regained its enthusiasm. Both firms entered,
resulting in a simultaneous overbuild.
In 1986, a second overbuild developed when the existing system in
Miami Beach, passing 68,000 homes and in place since 1978, was
overbuilt by a neighboring operator who had secured a duplicate
franchise. In the spring of 1986, a third overbuild began when Telesat,
through its purchase of a firm owning a duplicate cable franchise,
entered the West Dade County area, and began an ambitious
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overbuilding of the entire market area of about 100,000 homes. But
a flurry of lobbying activity convinced the County Commission that a
study was needed before Telesat should be allowed to compete head-to-
head. 117
B. Economic and Political Issues Raised by Duopoly: The Dade County
Example
The County Commission's call for a study represented a reversal of
the County's long-standing pro-competition policy and was justified on
two grounds: (1) the entrant could only profitably serve the high-
density areas, and such "cherry-picking" in rivalry would be unfair to
existing operators; and (2) while duopolistic competition might
occasionally occur, it is not likely to be significant in size or endure over
time. An independent consulting firm conducted a study for the
County. The study recommended that only small franchise areas be
opened to competitors, with the stipulation that such areas be fully
cabled before additional franchise rights would be granted."8
1. Cream-Skimming and Unsustainable Monopoly Arguments
The fear of cream-skimming or cherry-picking carries interesting
implications in the cable television market. Consumer surplus is
117. The Miami Herald responded:
This ought to be the Dade County Commission's motto: "When the going gets tough,
we order studies." True to that credo when faced with the politically difficult decision
to open the cable-television industry in Dade to competition, commissioners the other
day ordered a study to determine if competition is a good thing. Imagine: a taxpayer-
funded study to determine if the bedrock of American capitalism is a sound principle.
Compete for Cable TV, Miami Herald, May 3, 1987, at 2C, col. 1. The study, completed in
October 1987, found that a free entry policy was not in the public interest. See TOUCHE ROSS,
supra note 19, at 45.
118. See TOUCHE Ross, supra note 19. Numerous sources, including Dade County cable
regulatory personnel, justify regulation of franchises on the premise that intense price
competition in one period will inevitably lead to higher prices in future periods so as to recoup
short-term losses. This argument does not make economic sense. As unregulated monopoly
prices are currently charged, an entrant engaging in a predatory overbuild could-at
best--gain the market position to post prices at levels currently charged by the unregulated
monopoly franchise. Moreover, if a local cable market departs from textbook perfect
competition due to its above average sunk cost investment requirements, then the predatory
entrant is a mythological creature. The existence of two sunk infrastructures, even if only one
system operates, serves as a constraint against monopoly pricing, barring merger.
Furthermore, the idea that short-term price cuts followed by long-term monopoly pricing are
worse than short- and long-term monopoly pricing suffers arithmetically.
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unaffected by such activity. If an incumbent has wired 100 percent of
the market, and has been granted free market pricing, competitive
entry into any one sub-market does not change the intersection of
marginal revenue and marginal cost in any other sub-market. 19 The
existing operator may give cry to the existence of an unsustainable
natural monopoly, wherein (given a multi-period model with fixed costs
not sunk at the margin) entry barriers are required to obtain
optimality.12° Yet, sustainability of least-cost production methods
should not be confused with sustainability of capitalized monopoly
rents.
The evidence suggests that unregulated cable markets suffer from
no particular disability in thwarting inefficient entry. To achieve
sustainable monopoly, however, the incumbent may have to restrain its
monopolistic pricing behavior. This is apparently what incumbents do,
because there are scores of unfranchised yet non-overbuilt
jurisdictions.12' Moreover, the level of sustained rents currently
enjoyed by incumbent operators casts doubt on any sustainability
rationale for exclusive licensure.
The value (V) of a cable television system is the expected present
discounted value of its cash flows (CF), minus any avoidable capital
outlays:
ex ante: V - ECF. (1+r) - 0
i-I
119. Ignorance of this point has led to some curious policy pronouncements, such as the
statement by an attorney for a cable firm being overbuilt in West Palm Beach: "It sounds like
the consumer is getting a break because there's competition .... But those low prices are
being subsidized by those consumers who don't get any service." The Palm Beach Post, Apr.
29, 1987, at 8B. The fact that an area has already been wired for cable assures, in essence, that
they will continue to receive service. The only possibility for changing prices charged for such
output in response to partial entry involves the special case of a change in demand elasticity
due to a market segmentation. Where differential prices are legal (they are generally illegal
in franchise agreements), intense price competition in a sub-market may leave the remaining
non-overbuilt market with less elastic demand, thereby raising price, or with more elastic
demand, thereby leading to lower prices. The presumption, however, is that competitive entry
in the sub-market will, on net, increase demand elasticity in the remaining market by raising
the threat of entry. "Competition even at the fringes of each territory could have a powerful
demonstration and stimulative effect for the entire area." A. KAHN & I. STLzER. NATIONAL
ECONOMIC RESEARCH Assoc., COMMUNICATIONS REGULATORY REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE,
REPORT TO GOVxRNOR HUGH L CAREY (March 25, 1981).
120. Falhauber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enerprises, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 966,976
(1975).
121. See Private Monopoly, supra note 13, at 1372 n.130 (unfranchised markets are not
characterized by unsustainable monopoly).
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where an n-year project proceeds from investment I undertaken
at t=0, and r = discount rate appropriate for investments of such
riskiness.
ex post: V - max[ ECFI (G +r)-., sI]
i-I
where s = salvageable proportion of I, and s < 1.
A zero profit condition would suggest that V = 1.1 Hence, if cash
flows were insufficient to sustain V _> I, entry would not be likely. The
fact that V 2t 3I throughout the industry today demonstrates that
sustainability is not an issue in cable. Quoted in prices per subscriber,
systems now sell for approximately $2,000 (see Table 4). Capital costs
per subscriber, however, are in the $400-1,000 range for a monopoly
system,'23 even when costs are padded by expensive franchising
requirements.
Indeed, market analysts today estimate that 60 percent of a typical
cable system's equity value consists of intangibles; only 40 percent
consists of "property, plant and equipment" (based on replacement
value), yielding a Tobin q124 of 2.5.1215 An examination of cable
122. Here we abstract from capital depreciation, which would allow I to exceed V at a
moment in time if replacement cost were calculated as the price of undepreciated capital. We
also abstract from any firm-specific efficiencies or inefficiencies, dealing only with industry
averages.
123. The capital cost per subscriber, also known as replacement cost, has been estimated
at $616 by telecommunications consultants Shooshan & Jackson for an average cable system in
a typical cable market. SHOOSHAN & JACKSON, INC.. OPENING THE BROADBAND GATEWAY:
THE NEED FOR TELEPHONE COMPANY ENTRY INTO THE VIDEO SERVICES MARKETPLACE 13
(October 1987). This is virtually identical to the estimate derived from the data given in Albert
Smiley's analysis for the U.S. Department ofJustice. A. SMILEY, supra note 52, at 21-22. Using
industry means for penetration (.56), density (90 homes per mile), and costs ($23,000 per mile
of cable plant; $1.2 million for head-end and start-up; $120 for converter and subscriber hook-
up), the capital expense per basic subscriber for the typical 50,000 home market assumed by
Smiley equals $619. Cost/sub = [(1,2000,000)/50,000(.56)] + [(23,000)/90(.56)] + 120 = 619.
124. Tobin q = market value of assets/capital cost of asset. It is the accepted measure of
monopoly rents. A zero-profit condition (i.e., robust competition) implies a q ratio equal to
one.
125. PAUL KAGAN Assocs., supra note 110, at 218 (pro forma analysis by Deloit, Haskins,
and Sells). Physical plant typically contributes overwhelmingly to capital cost. Smiley allows
for $600,000 in start-up and franchise acquisition costs for a 50,000 home market, i.e., about
$12 per home passed, or about $22 per subscriber at the mean national penetration rate. A.
SMILEY, supra note 52. Franchise acquisition costs can be significantly higher due to rent
seeking, but that is a symptom, not a cause, of market power.
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Table 4126
Cable Television Values: 1985-88
No. of
No. of System Basic Subs
Period Sales Involved Price/Sub ($) Price/HP Cs)
Jan.-June, 1985 138 2,607,543 1,074 487
Jan.-June, 1986 211 4,608,724 1,343 681
Jan.-June, 1987 176 5,856,004 1,506 814
Jan.-June, 1988 202 7,635,198 1,997 1,153
industry data in December of 1986 cable found a Tobin q of 2.81 using
medium replacement cost assumptions. 2 7 This result was far higher
than the U.S. nonfinancial firm average of 0.805.128
It appears that incumbent operators sought to protect genuine
rents-not quasi-rents-in arguing that Telesat's entry would cause
irreparable economic havoc. A comparison of Dade County's firms (see
Table 5 on next page) indicates that the damage to the rents of
incumbent operators may be considerable.
2. Longevity of Competitive Entry Argument
Just as cream-skimming poses no threat to consumer surplus in this
market, questions about the likelihood or longevity of competitive entry
in local cable markets are similarly misplaced in the policy discussion.
A market may be heavily biased towards the survivorship of a sole
supplier, yet still not pose the problem for consumers of being a
natural monopoly. Indeed, this is an apt application of the
126. Paul Kagan Assoc., Cable System Sales Compariso, April-June 1988, CABLE TELEVISION
INVESTOR, July 31, 1988, at 4.
127. SHOOSHAN & JACKSON, INC., supra note 123.
128. Id. at 14. One recent sale of a 7,400-subscriber cable system brought a per-subscriber
price of $2,500 in a city where a request for a competitive franchise had been made by a
neighboring firm which had publicly announced its intention to overbuild the market. While
the seller alleged that the threat depressed his sales price from what it would have been absent
the threat, it is clear that the market value was nowhere near an unsustainable margin. See
Grunbaum & Bulkley, Rosevile Cable TV System Sold for Record Price, Bus. J. (Sacramento, Cal.).
Nov. 23, 1987, at 1, 33.
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Table 5129
Dade County: Cable Prices and Services
No. of No. of
Channels Basic Basic No. of Basic
on Basic Satellite Channels Pay 1st Pay Rate Install.
(Total) Channels Off Air Channels ($/mo.) (S/tmo.) Fee ($)
Adelphia 30 14 12 5 12.95 19.95 39.95
Storer 33 17 12 5 11.16 16.50 50.00
South
Storer 31 14 10 4 12.00 14.81 25.00
North
Dynamic 40 22 12 5 9.95 14.81 40.00
Dynamic* 40 22 12 5 9.95 9.95 0.00
Telesat 42 22 13 8 9.95 9.95 15.00
*Only in overbuilt area.
contestability principle.3 0
endure, it can still form
Where entry is possible, but unlikely to
an important competitive constraint on
incumbent behavior. In such a market, the removal of the threat of
potential entry will erase this important source of competition. The
prospects for prolonged duopolistic competition are largely irrelevant
129. These data were compiled from several sources: information sent from Telesat to
author (June 1987) (on file with author); FLORIDA CABLE TELEVISION Assoc., 1987-88
DiRECTORy & DESK GuWE 56-59, 88-91 (1987); Soto, Cut-rate Firm May Touch Off Cable TV War,
Miami Herald, Mar. 12, 1987, at BI.
130. BAUMOL, PANZAR, & WuILG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY
STRUCTURE 291 (1982). The contestability principle focuses on the monopoly problem as a
problem of market process rather than of market structure. A monopoly structure exists where
a single firm serves a market. But if the monopoly is maintained only by competitive
performance, the process is contestable. A prospective competitor will more likely contest the
monopoly and enter the market if she can either easily secure long-term contracts with
consumers or easily retrieve her capital investment if her venture fails. Therefore the key to
whether a monopolist must perform competitively is, generally, a question as to contracting and
exi costs. This line of reasoning is basically an extension of Demsetz, supra note 70. See also
T. Hazlett, Franchise Bidding and the Monopoly Problem: The Demsetz Solution on Cable,
(June 1989) (paper presented at Western Economics Association annual meetings).
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for purposes of restraining monopolistic pricing, given that where
contestability is present, a monopolist will exercise restraint. More
fundamentally, as Schumpeter observed, the "leap frogging" of
successive monopoly firms can act as the driving force in dynamic
economic progress, as well as the primary efficiency motivation for
monopoly survivors struggling to prevent their displacement by the
next "gale of creative destruction".'' In short, the sustainability of
a duopolistic market structure appears to have little bearing on the
economic desirability of opening entry into monopolized markets.
3. Franchise Authority Response to Duopoly in Dade County
To return to the Dade County cable market, the reaction by the
overbuilt incumbent, Dynamic, to the entry of Telesat has been
pointed: Dynamic has matched the entrant by reducing its basic price
by one-third, although just in the overbuilt areas. Dynamic offers this
to customers on a six-month contract basis. Apparently, the firm
believes that post-entry price matching is an optimal reaction strategy;
Dynamic's prices in non-overbuilt areas remain fixed at high, pre-entry
levels.
The aggressiveness of Telesat has precipitated strong political
reaction. The Florida Cable Television Association, the operators' trade
group, won passage of a statute, effective October 1, 1987, which
requires all new entrants to gain cable franchises (some areas had
allowed entry without such permits) and establishes strict standards and
extinsive procedures for their issuance."' These requirementsinclude a lengthy series of mandated public studies and hearings to
131. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84 (1942). In Schumpeter's
view, the ideal of perfct competition was a confusion at best. A market filled with atomistic
suppliers was not an appropriate goal for real-world policy makers. This parallels the present
discussion of competition in the cable industry, where a numbers approach to competition is
in evidence (one firm is a monopoly, two firms is competition). According to Schumpeter, the
most important type of rivalry was competition that "strikes not at the margins of the profits
and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives." Id.
Competition, then, may have its greatest impact when quite invisible to the unaided eye, to wit:
It is hardly necessary to point out that competition of the kind we now have in mind
acts not only when in being but also when it is merely an ever-present threat. It
disciplines before it attacks. The businessman feels himself to be in a competitive
situation even if he is alone in his field or if, though not alone, he holds a position such
that investigating government experts fail to see any effective competition between him
and any other firms in the same or a neighboring field ....
Id. at 85.
132. FLA. STAT. § 166.046 (1989).
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establish whether any public need exists for a second cable entrant and
to ensure that, if public need does exist, the second franchisee receives
permission to enter on terms not less onerous than those included in
the incumbent's franchise award. For instance, if an initial franchisee
were required to serve all residents-a universal service
requirement--the entrant would also be mandated to wire all
homes.' Obviously, this requirement creates barriers to entry that
will discourage competition; it is promoted by incumbent operators
who insist that they do not mind competition as long as the entrant
overbuilds them everywhere. Such regulatory activity, through which
incumbent monopolists exploit franchise barriers when plausible
welfare arguments for monopoly protection do not exist, smacks
strongly of government-assisted predation,' and is a classic
demonstration of the strategy of "Raising Rivals' Costs."'3 5
C. Duopolistic Competition in Sacramento
A study of the Sacramento CATV market illustrates a host of
interesting theoretical issues. After studying the franchise question for
three years, the local Cable Commission (contracting jointly for the City
and County of Sacramento) awarded a franchise monopoly in 1982.
However, when the Cable Commission, in rounds of post-award
renegotiations, refused to waive certain promises that had been made
by the awardee, the awardee forfeited the franchise. In late 1983, the
Cable Commission issued a new franchise to a firm that similarly
attempted a renegotiation in 1984-85, and that ultimately left the
market by assigning its franchise to a junior partner. Shortly
thereafter, the junior partner obtained significant post-franchise
concessions. Thus, the franchise fell to Scripps Howard," 6 which
began construction in August 1985. The Sacramento market, with an
133. Advocates of such entry requirements rely on the level playing field rationale, which
argues that free entry into incumbent cable markets is inherently unfair to established
operators who, it is said, paid a price to enter first. This stands the natural monopoly rationale
on its head. Cable operators in other states have been quick to embrace the defensive strategy
of state franchising legislation. Five states, including Florida, had passed such measures, called
overbuild laws, as of October 1988. Hangsted, Ops Won Overbuild Protection in Four States,
MULTICHANNEL NEwS, Dec. 26, 1988, at 8.
134. See, e.g., Miller & Pautler, Predation.- The Changing View in Economics and Law, 28J.L
& EcON. 495, 500-02 (1985).
135. Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power
Over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209 (1986).
136. Scripps Howard is the parent company of Sacramento Cable Television.
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estimated 350,000 homes, is one of the larger franchises in the
nation.15 7
In July 1987, the Cable Commission abandoned its monopoly
franchise arrangement by opening the entire market to all comers on
a license basis. The Commission greatly reduced entry requirements
pertaining to public safety provisions, bonding requirements, and
technical standards, and eliminated regulation concerning public access
and local origination, universal service, and subsidies to community
organizations. This policy shift was a direct response to a successful
lawsuit brought by Pacific West Cable Company, which had attempted
unsuccessfully to enter the market in 1983 without a franchise. In
March, April, and May of 1987, a jury heard arguments on Pacific
West's claims that the Cable Commission's exclusion of non-franchised
entrants violated the First Amendment.'s In June, the jury found
that the Sacramento cable market was not a natural monopoly and that
the claim of "'natural monopoly' was a sham used by defendants as a
pretext for granting a single cable television franchise.., to promote
the making of cash payments and provision of 'in-kind' services ...
[and] to obtain increased campaign contributions."'3 9 In reaction to
these findings, and in an effort to soften the judge's imminent pro-
competition decision, which was issued in August 1987, the City
adopted an open entry policy in July 1987.14 In November, the first
outbreak of duopolistic competition occurred when the entrant Cable
Americal overbuilt Scripps Howard's cable network in the North
Highlands area. 41
137. Barnes, Why Cable TV Costs Too Much, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, June 1989, at 13-14;
Mayer, Complex Path for Cable TV, Sacramento Bee, July 19, 1987, at A30.
138. The author testified as an expert witness in these proceedings on behalf of Pacific
West.
139. Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. 1322, 1349-50 (E.D. Cal.
1987).
140. Evans, Cable Saga Now Includes Foes Going Head-to-Head, Bus. J. (Sacramento, Cal.),
Dec. 7, 1987, at 21, 32. It is important to note that the Commission did not give up its natural
monopoly defense of franchising, however. It issued entry licenses with a five-year life only,
and publicly maintained that competition would not develop and endure in the marketplace,
Presumably, the short-lived licenses (the incumbent's franchise was originally issued for a 20-
year period) will assist the locality in reverting to its exclusive franchising arrangement at some
future point, if it can show that a lack of competition, i.e., overbuilds, has proven the
government's case ex post. This supposition is buttressed by the December 1987 extension ol
the incumbent's franchise for an additional twenty years. A forty-year franchise now gives the
incumbent a larger window to recoup investments made to eliminate rivals possessing five year
licenses. Id. Interestingly, the December 1987 agreement also permits the incumbent to charge
lower prices in duopoly neighborhoods, although new entrants' licenses prohibit such
discrimination. Mayer, Capital Cable Firms Going Head to Head, Sacramento Bee, Dec. 17, 1987,
at BI-2. This policy dichotomy is more interesting from a legal than from an economic
standpoint, because entrants will generally face direct competition everywhere.
141. Evans, supra note 140, at 33.
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Cable Americal was an established franchisee at a nearby military
installation, McClellan Air Force Base, and was able to expand its cable
network quickly into adjacent Sacramento neighborhoods. The pricing
policy adopted in response by the incumbent is informative. The
entrant, Cable Americal, hoped to gain market penetration by offering
36-42 channels of basic service for a $10 installation fee and $10 a
month, significantly undercutting Scripps Howard's 40-channel basic
service offered for $14.50 per month.142
In responding, Scripps Howard sought to establish a general policy:
it would lower price to match the entrant, while offering free
installation and three months of basic service at no charge, in every
area where it ficed direct competition. Moreover, it pledged never to
be undersold by the entrant.1 43  After a rugged six-month
competition, the incumbent bought out the entrant for a price several
times the incumbent's capital costs.'" A third firm, Pacific West
Cable Co., which had initiated the prior key litigation, entered the
Sacramento market and was immediately confronted by Scripps
Howard's selective price-cutting strategy. Pacific West decided to make
an issue of the discriminatory strategy through radio and newspaper
advertisements suggesting that customers in sole-supplier areas demand
the same low prices offered by Scripps Howard in overbuilt areas.141
D. Economic and Political Issues Raised by Duopoly: The Sacramento
Example
1. Market Predation
The above-described competitive struggle reveals an essential barrier
to competitive entry in the CATV industry--capital fixity-that is not
an artificial barrier created by franchise regulations.1 46 According to
142. Mayer, supra note 140, at B2.
143. Id. at B1.
144. Telephone interview with Robert Ling, President of Cable Americal (Feb. 7, 1990).
145. See, e.g., Sacramento Bee, Sept. 23, 1988, at B4.
146. While the following discussion focuses on market predation through extra-legal
barriers to entry apparently operating in the Sacramento market, such predation is likely to
be facilitated by artificial barriers such as franchising requirements. As long-run entry barriers
of some form must be available for predatory actions to be viable, the ability to reimpose de
facto franchise limitations on new rivals after existing entrants are deterred quite conceivably
forms a vital aspect of predation strategy. The alternative, nonlegal entry deterrent that makes
predation costs a possibly positive profit stratagem is, of course, the presence of significant sunk
capital.
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Robert Bork, a leading expert on antitrust law, the largest cost of
predatory pricing in a typical oligopolistic market is that associated with
price discounts to infra-marginal customers.14 Rather than simply
discounting to those purchasers an entrant might service, a predatory
incumbent must lower price across the entire market. This places a
large burden upon the monopolist, as predation generally implies
pricing below marginal cost; hence, per unit losses are being sustained
across an expanded level of output. This creates an asymmetry in the
losses sustained by the entrant and the incumbent. The entrant,
attempting only to take some market position, is not committed to
sustaining losses across the entire demand curve, as is the incumbent.
It is this disparity in the distribution of losses during a predatory
struggle which, in Bork's analysis, makes predation such a weak threat
and, therefore, an unlikely tool.148
The existence of sunk cable plant, however, precisely identifies sub-
markets of entrants and thus mitigates the problem of infra-marginal
customers for the incumbent. 49  Predatory price cuts need not be
sustained across all customers, and the losses of incumbent and entrant
will diverge in reverse: the entrant will sustain losses across its entire
output range, the incumbent across a limited slice of its output.
Indeed, focusing on just those segments where entry can physically
However, the presence of sunk capital in the cable industry does not, taken alone, appear
to be sufficient to bar entry. When new entrants may enter markets via long-term contracting,
as they routinely do in cable in multiple dwelling unit sub-markets, or with superior
technology, an incumbent's sunk capital is no guarantee against competition. The significance
of any given level of specific capital is itself uncertain, varying not only between industries, but
between firms, markets and over time in the same industry. Franchise barriers may be viewed
by incumbent operators as having less variance than sunk capital as a deterrent to entry. In
any event, both forms of incumbent protection are reinforcing. Moreover, the fact that legal
barriers are diligently pursued by cable firms, sometimes at great cost (it is not uncommon for
monopolists to pay the municipality's legal fees in a court defense of franchising), indicates that
the franchise adds substantial entry deterrence at the margin.
147. Infra-marginal customers are those customers who will continue to buy from the
incumbent, who are not on the margin of switching to the entrant. Since the reach of fixed
cable plant so neatly identifies their geographic position beyond the reach of the entrant,
consumers in monopoly areas can still be charged monopoly prices and kept off the margin.
148. R. BORE, THE AnTuusT PARADOx 348 (1978).
149. When an entrant owning a monopoly cable system attempts to compete in a new
market, it exposes itself to retaliation. Indeed, immediately after the federal ruling allowing
competition in sacramento, Scripps Howard (parent firm of Sacramento Cable Television)
threatened to overbuild the Roseville and Truckee, California systems owned by two Pacific
West principals. See Haugsted, Roseille CA System Sold As It Faces Overbuild Threat,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Nov. 16, 1987, at 68. This may be one very good reason why
established cable firms so rarely compete directly with each other and, conversely, why the
firms which do compete are industry outsiders, such as Telesat Cablevision. See infra note 176
and accompanying text.
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occur, the incumbent is able to employ a panoply of scale advantages,
for example, in marketing and brand name identifiability, further
biasing competitive losses towards the entrant.
Another effect of capital fixity that eases predation is that the range
of predatory pricing can be increased above average variable cost
(AVC) to just below the entrant's average total cost (ATC). As
extension into sub-markets causes the entrant to undertake nontrivial
and nonsalvageable investments, an incumbent who sets prices equal
to or above ATC may be able to discourage an equally efficient
entrant. 5°  This facilitates predation by lowering the cost of
predation to the incumbent. In CATV, this price competition is
rendered effective, as well, by the high cross-elasticities of demand
between cable products. Where products are more greatly
differentiated, the predatory possibilities are less, and the likelihood of
entry greater. The importance of product differentiation has regularly
been observed in the cable industry as old, classic 12-channel capacity
systems have been considered the prime targets of successful
overbuilds. The availability to an entrant of high-demand local sports
programming not carried by an incumbent, for similar reasons, has
been considered a key to competitive entry.'
It is important, however, to distinguish the capital fixity problem
from the wasteful duplication argument commonly advanced in
support of the claim that cable markets are incontestable or should be
rendered so through regulation. The cost to a second firm of rewiring
a market is a factor discouraging entry, but it is a cost entirely
internalized by the entrant (disregarding public nuisance problems,
which can most directly be dealt with-irrespective of market
structure-via appropriate charges, fines, bonds, or regulations). If a
second firm can enter and make an economic profit of zero or better,
the sinking of additional capital will be in the public interest at the
margin. While it may be true that it would have been preferable for
the incumbent to provide better services for lower prices and, hence,
eliminate the need for this capital outlay, this is an irrelevant
consideration for purposes of policy. If the institutional tools were
available to realize such an outcome, entry would not be viable. The
problem hindering competition in these markets is quite distinct from
150. However, pricing below marginal cost seems to be a possible strategy, as well. In
Orange County, Florida, incumbent supplier Cablevision of Central Florida cut prices only to
existing customers and did not offer the rates to newcomers. "We're doing this to thwart any
losses of our subs to other companies," claimed an executive of the firm, in assuring the public
their price cutting "is not an effort to gain new" customers. If Cablevision had been charging
above marginal cost, it should have welcomed new customers. Dukes, supra note 109.
151. A. SMILEY, supra note 52, at 32 n.40.
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wasteful duplication of capital arguments: entry will be optimal at
existing, pre-entry, market prices, but may not materialize because of
post-entry predation. The easy geographical identification and
separation of consumers, coupled with the necessity of bond posting in
specific capital, makes predation a relatively cheap defensive strategy.
2. Possible Solutions to Market Predation
A solution to this dilemma is suggested by the contracting literature,
pioneered by Harold Demsetz. 152 In CATV markets, an incumbent
engages in predatory practices in limited sub-markets where entry has
(physically) surfaced, holding its "infra-competitive" consumers 55
hostage, in effect, to its monopoly pricing. A proconsumer solution is
for some contracting institution to arise, allowing consumers to
purchase cable services from the suppliers-existing or
potential-providing the most competitively priced long-term
arrangement, as explicitly modeled in Posner'1 and Hazlett.'55
However, the costliness of arranging such private contracting solutions
forms the heart of the modern defense of public utility-type
regulation.' 56
As franchise entry barriers in cable are declared unconstitutional, a
trend now gaining momentum, it will be important to watch for the
emergence of private contracting forms. 5 7  Incumbents hope that
customers remain difficult to organize into bargaining units. Entrants,
however, will actively seek out efficient contracting agents, such as
developers, landlords, and associations of homeowners and condo
owners, and will offer enhanced product packages that attach to real
property instead of transient residents. More subtle forms of contract
will also be of importance. For example, if entry firm reputation is, or
152. Demsetz, supra note 70.
153. Consumers who are not on the competitive (overbuilt) fringe.
154. Posner, supra note 22, at 112.
155. Hazlett, Private Contracting v. Public Regulation as a Solution to the Natural Monopoly
Problem, in UNNATUtAL MONOPOLIES 71, 75-82 (Poole ed. 1985).
156. See Competition v. Franchise Monopoly, supra note 49, at 80; Goldberg, supra note 70;
Williamson, supra note 70.
157. For cases declaring franchise barriers to be unconstitutional, see Preferred
Communications, Inc. v. City of Lis Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396,1406-07 (9th Cir. 1985), aft'd, 476
U.S. 488 (1986); Century Federal, Inc. v. Palo Alto, 7 10 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Pacific
West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Cal. 1987); Group W Cable,
Inc. v. City of Santa Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Cal. 1987). But see Erie
Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580, aftd, 853 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1988);
Norwest Cable Communications Partnership v. City of St. Paul, No. 3-83 CIV 1228 (D. Minn.
Sept 1, 1988).
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becomes, important to consumers, post-entry price discounting to deter
entrants will be more costly for incumbents and competitive entry will
thereby be encouraged. At the limit, large entry-firm reputational
capital would force pre-entry price cutting to a competitive level, thus
gaining the benefits of entry without the expense of actual entry. Such
contract forms are certainly not zero-priced, but neither is the
alternative of public regulation. As federal constraints on local
authorities have neutralized whatever price constrainifig, pro-consumer
options were once available, private contracting to expand the scope of
competition appears to present almost no risk to consumers.
3. Franchise Authority Response to Duopoly in Sacramento-
The Public Choice Model
A key piece of evidence supporting the public choice model
presented in this Article is that public franchising agents, far from
facilitating such contracting efficiencies, have generally sought to
suppress them. In Sacramento, the instant case study, the local
authorities issued a monopoly franchise and for four years vigorously
fought lawsuits demanding competitive entry. The prices the
incumbent monopolist would charge consumers were not, and could
not have been, an issue of contention between the incumbent and the
Cable Commission.' Only the level of support payments to the
Commission and to various interest groups, as mandated in the
franchise agreement, were at issue.'59
The municipal government's role as the consumer's bargaining
agent is severely compromised by the availability of low-cost rent
transfers to well organized pressure groups. That is, in sponsoring a
rent-seeking competition for a franchise monopoly, local officials
become the arbiters of an auction to assign monopoly rents to a
politically-optimal coalition of interests. Supervising such transfers,
rather than pressing for policies that produce lower prices to
consumers, has a low cost for political decisionmakers. The average
voter, acting rationally, is often ignorant of the price differentials
involved, knowledge of which would require a detailed study of the
CATV industry. Moreover, he does not vote on a cable referendum
158. Since 1979, California has given permission to cable operators to opt out of local rate
regulation. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53066.1 (West 1988).
159. This is a general phenomenon. T. Hazlett, supra note 47, at 7-8.
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directly but for specific candidates who have other relevant
differences.' In elections where many issues are involved, and cable
policy is viewed as a non-excludable public good, individual voters have
little incentive to invest in obtaining information, especially since their
vote is not likely to determine the outcome of the election.''
In Sacramento, a straightforward exchange encouraged municipal
authorities to create an exclusive franchise. To obtain the right of
monopoly entry, Scripps Howard paid the federally-established limit in
fees to county officials-five percent of gross revenues. Even after
payment of the fees, however, excess demand existed for monopoly
rights. Hence, the following additional payments were pledged:
(1) a commitment to "universal service," wiring even low density
portions of the market, at a loss of $5.6 million, as estimated by the
firm; (2) grants to "public, educational and access groups" of $1 per
subscriber per month; (3) subsidies for production staff, facilities and
in-house programming for local origination and access channels,
amounting to about $1.43 per subscriber per month; (4) over-
investment in channel capacity and head-end costing approximately
$6.7 million, or 38¢ per subscriber per month and; (5) subsidies for
government institutional use of cable technologies, on the order of 6.6v
per subscribei per month. 112
The total public benefits explicitly bid, 6 not including the five
percent franchise fee, amounted to $111 million over the twenty-year
franchise, with a $34 million present value, discounted at the high 1986
rate of fourteen percent. (My above calculations for cost of subsidies
assumed a twelve percent discount rate and a penetration rate of .50).
This may be a fairly standard division of costs, as one study has found
160. In three instances where voters have decided the cable franchising issue explicitly,
they have voted overwhelmingly for free entry. In Waldport, Oregon, the City Council
unanimously denied a small local cable operator the right to overbuild a nationally integrated
firm providing service to the city, but the small cable operator subsequently won a referendum
by the astonishing vote of 266-26. The Register Guard (Eugene, Or.), Nov. 24, 1987, at ID.
In Cleveland, voters approved two measures on the November 1988 ballot opening the local
cable market to new entry by a combined total of 186,640 to 85,834. Cleveland Plain Dealer,
Nov. 9, 1988, at Cl. In Colorado Springs, Colorado, voters gave a competitive franchise to
Citizens Cable by a 4-1 margin in 1985. Moozakis, supra note 17, at 22.
161. See Brennan & Buchanan, Voter Choice, 28 AM. BEHAV. SCi. 185, 191 (1975).
162. TOUCHE Ross, SACRAMENTO METROPOLITAN CABLE TELEVISION COM-
MISSION-FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL CABLE TELEVISION FRANCHISE
AWARDS (July 30, 1986).
163. Implicitly, political benefits were bid. Most obviously, five percent of the stock of the
firm was distributed to 73 influential local citizens who had made no financial contribution.
This group included Michael Deaver and a sitting federal judge. See Hazlett, Wiring the
ConstiS/on for Cable, 1988 REGULATION 30.
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about twenty-six percent of capital expense attributable to franchise
demands.' 4
It is commonly known that the worth of such public access/local
origination services is far below their opportunity cost. The assertion
that these channels are unprofitable forms the basis of the political
commitment among franchising agents to use their monopoly
bargaining power to force the supplier to provide nonrenumerative
programming. The use of market power-protected by legal franchise
barriers--is explicitly advanced on just this rationale:
firms may commit to provide certain public benefits in
conjunction with their systems, to be paid out of the added profit
increment the firms expect to achieve because they believe they
can price above the competitive rate. By public benefits we mean
services on system features that the operator would not believe
to be profitable in themselves, but which were nevertheless
committed to in order to obtain the franchise.165
The legal protection of monopoly rents is central to the pay-out
arrangement agreed to by the winning franchisee. This is evidenced
in the Sacramento franchise agreement's escape valve, formally called
an "Equality of Regulatory Considerations" clause, and referred to in
the industry as a "favored nations" plank. This proviso frees the
monopolist from subsidy obligations in the event that competitors are,
at some future date, allowed to enter with less costly subsidy
obligations. Keeping out competitive entrants was openly justified in
Sacramento on the grounds that the benefits of rate competition were
likely to be dominated by the loss of public benefits paid for out of the
incumbent's monopoly profits; such public benefits would be eliminated
upon occurrence of the new unregulated entry by triggering the
Equality of Regulatory Considerations dause. 66  Indeed, the
incumbent refused to provide such subsidy payments upon initiation
of the County's open entry policy, and was soon required to pay far
less. 67  The firm's president noted that "the agreement frees his
company.., to reduce its community obligations that competitors do
164. Zupan, supra note 45.
165. TOuCHE ROSS, supra note 162, at 24.
166. Id.
167. See Mayer, Cable Finn Hammers Out New Deal, Sacramento Bee, Dec. 8, 1987, at BI.
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years into the franchise, when nearly every Sacramento neighborhood
had been wired by the incumbent.
This strategic interplay is helpful in explaining the industrial
organization question at hand: Can potential entry serve to constrain
incumbent monopolists? The actions taken in the Sacramento case
shed doubt on the existence of a natural monopoly. If cost
subadditivity prevailed in the Sacramento market or in cable generally,
no favored nations clauses would be necessary. A true natural
monopoly would retain its rents without franchise barriers; second
entrants would be deterred naturally.'69 The quid pro quo contract,
wherein legal exclusivity is exchanged for public benefits, undermines
its very exegesis when premised on the rationale of natural monopoly,
as in the case of Sacramento. 7 °
E. General Lessons for Overbuilding from Florida and Sacramento: First
Entrant Predation Versus Subadditivity of Costs
It is worth noting that the two episodes discussed here do not
represent quixotic outliers, brought into the marketplace solely by the
efforts of entrepreneurial kamikazes. Nor do they represent simple
turf disputes as was the conventional wisdom just a few years ago. 7'
Whether such duopolies live and grow in these markets or not, they
have been begun as straightforward profit opportunities by
presumptively competent maximizers. Such ventures offer evidence
similar subsidization of various services, the incumbent instantly filed a lawsuit charging that
their franchise agreement had been breached, despite its non-exclusive language. See
SACRAMENTO METROPOITAN CABLE TELEVISION COMMISSION, PUBLIC STATEMENT (Aug. 6,
1987).
169. An argument could be made that targeted entry, the value of the franchise divided
by the amount invested, makes an otherwise efficient sole supplier unsustainable. Falhauber,
supra note 120. However, with a q-ratio averaging three, the need for entry barriers to achieve
sustainability appears dubious. See supra text accompanying notes 119-28. A more plausible
explanation would be that entry barriers are required for rent protection.
170. See Letter from Bob Smith, Executive Director of the Sacramento Metropolitan Cable
Television Commission, to Commission Members 12 (July 31, 1986) ("Cable TV in Sacramento
is a natural monopoly and will not support two competing cable systems for a sustained
period.').
171. See Noam, supm note 28. The new conventional wisdom within the industry was
recently set forth at a session of the Western Cable Television Show's December 3, 1987, session
on "Overbuilds-Real Competition, Greenmail or Hype." Samuel Book, a former economics
professor now with the cable consulting firm Malarkey-Taylor, deduced the following:
"Overbuilds are here to stay. They are not an ephemeral, one-in-a-thousand fluke as they have
been in the cable industry during its history up to now. They are likely to become a
permanent and growing feature on the cable landscape." S. Book, Remarks at the Western
Cable Television Show's Session on "Overbuilds-- Real Competition, Green mail or Hype" (Dec.
3, 1987) (audio recording).
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Whether such duopolies live and grow in these markets or not, they
have been begun as straightforward profit opportunities by
presumptively competent maximizers. Such ventures offer evidence
contradicting the earlier natural monopoly view of cable, and suggest
that the CATV market is contestable.
In recent years established monopolists have been economically
challenged by overbuilders in cities including Mobile and Huntsville,
Alabama; Colorado Springs, Colorado; Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Terre
Haute, Indiana; Ridgeland, Mississippi; Easton, Pennsylvania; and
Huntington, New York.17" The rate of entry is plainly increasing.
While a 1979 report noted that "there has not been a significant new
overlapping franchise award in the last seven years,"'17 a 1988 survey
listed 48 markets with current overbuilds in whole or in part.174 The
cable industry is keenly aware of the trend and the prospects for
further entry that industry profitability invites. In a blunt report, the
senior editor of a leading trade journal recently wrote:
By now everyone in the cable business recognizes that it's
often cheaper to build a new system than to buy an existing one.
But the overbuild threat has been brushed aside with arguments
such as: "You'll never be able to get financing," or "No cable
operator would ever intrude on another operator's territory."
Cable Television Show's Session on "Overbuilds-- Real Competition, Greenmail or Hype" (Dec.
3, 1987) (audio recording).
172. Paul Kagan Assocs., supra note 5. at 1-2 (Supp.); Wolf, Newcomer to Huntsville Puts
Pressure on Comcast Systemn, CABLEVISION, Apr. 27, 1987, at 12; The Free Market Thumphant, The
Huntsville Times, Dec. 11, 1986, at 1. In these markets, entry appears to have been a welfare-
enhancing tool, even where duopoly ended in merger. In Huntington, the entrant routed the
incumbent, after a four-year competition, with output, as measured by basic subscribers,
increasing significantly from 25,000 to 39.000 basic subscribers. Interview with Randy
McCormick, Hempsted Cablevision, in Huntington, N.Y. (Feb. 17, 1988). In Mobile, the
incumbent purchased the entrant, yet prices fell and quality, measured in channels of basic,
increased, resulting in higher penetration levels. Cable industry interests have labeled the
entrant involved in the Mobile market as a green-mailer who profited from taking the
monopolist's payoff. Telephone interview with Will Wessel, Community Dev. Office, City of
Mobile (Feb. 17, 1988). To the extent the assertion is true--that is, to the extent the entrant
profited-entry has been shown to be viable. And, given an elastic supply of potential green-
mailers, a non-franchise protected incumbent would be forced to give away the entire sum of
incumbent quasi-rents, unless it deterred entry through limit-pricing strategies. Such episodes
offer contrary evidence to Noam's assertion that the reality of such markets "violates the criteria
for actual or potential contestability." Noam, supra note 28, at 114. While perfect contestability
would imply a zero-profit equilibrium that is dearly not achieved, observation now suggests that
entry is a credible threat to both incumbents and overbuilders.
173. Booz ALLEN, supra note 81, at I-3.
174. Paul Kagan Assocs., supra note 5, at 1-3 (Supp.).
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There's nothing wrong with those arguments. But what
happens when you already have the financing, or when you
aren't among the top 50 MSO's [multiple system operators]? 175
The appearance of competitors willing to commit investment capital in
markets of average density, with abundant broadcast competition, at
prices twenty-five percent below established monopoly rates, has not
escaped the attention of industry insiders.
All this leads to the conclusion that the constraint on entry is not so
much the presence of subadditivity, as the strategic behavior by first
movers and franchising agents. Telesat's ambitious thrust throughout
Florida's cable market is sensible-and enlightening, in retrospect-in
at least three respects. First, it is non-MSO entry. Telesat has no
monopoly backyard to protect. Striking down legal barriers to entry
does not cost it foregone rents, and retaliatory entry is avoided. 76
Second, because it is a well-financed and sophisticated operation with
large designs on multiple market entry across the state, Telesat can
absorb the cost of hurdling individual market entry prohibitions. As it
pioneers overbuilding in its region, it internalizes a much higher ratio
of the gains from competition than would a local cable entrant. This
effect is reinforced, thirdly, by Telesat's superior technology; fifty-
four channels can be delivered at significantly lower cost today than
was possible a few years ago, particularly where expensive franchise
obligations are avoided. All three factors aid in upsetting the public
choice calculus developed with respect to a single market earlier in this
Article,177 where the incumbent has much more to lose than the
entrant can hope to gain. The rare combination of a large state-of-the-
art cable competitor with no interest in monopoly maintenance is what
makes Telesat a uniquely disagreeable player to incumbents in the
CATV marketplace.
Conclusion
The public policy of franchise exclusivity is likely to produce only
limited benefits. Because duopoly reliably raises consumer surplus, the
only potential downside results from lost profitability by suppliers. As
discussed above, the cost of duopoly, as opposed to monopoly, springs
from the heightened average costs of the industry's first mover. These
175. Kerver, Not-So-Distant Drums, CABiLE TELEVISION Bus., Dec. 1, 1987, at 55.
176. See Milgram and Roberts, Predaton, Reputation and Enty Deterrwe, 27 J. ECON.
THEORY 280 (1982). See also supra note 149.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
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cost changes reflect infra-marginal considerations: the amortization of
fixed costs. This loss in profit is not a social loss. Moreover, it can be
eliminated at low transaction cost through either of the following
mechanisms: limit pricing by an incumbent or aggressive de novo
entrant, possibly with long-term service contracts or brand name
investment that make pricing commitments credible, or merger. In
selecting a profit-maximizing entry strategy, firms will inherently
choose to enter an already built market either via purchase or
overbuild. A virgin market will be entered solely, simultaneously, or
via merger. In any case, alternatives to overbuilding and its attendant
loss of profit are available without difficult contracting problems, and
need not be supplied by the franchising authority.
To view market entry decisions as rational is not synonymous with
a laissez-faire policy rule, however. The rationale for regulation of a
natural monopoly is that certain efficient transactions cannot
realistically be achieved by market forces alone. Public-utility-type
regulation is needed to deal with the transacting problem that exists
when efficiency dictates that large numbers of consumers should desire
to enter long-term commitments with efficient natural monopolists.
Policy should be rationally aligned to confront such large-numbers
problems, rather than to conduct profit projections mechanically as a
substitute for self-interested market supply judgments unconstrained
by transacting difficulties.178
178. Public franchising authorities have attempted to nakedly outguess firm maximization
decisions. The New Jersey Board of Public Utilities is charged, by a state statute, with
preventing, via franchising policy, "an unreasonable duplication of services likely to be
detrimental to the development of adequate cable television service in any area. . . ." J.
Cleary, Experimental Dual Franchise in Paramus 2 (August 22, 1980) (New Jersey Board of
Public Utilities memorandum).
Similarly, the City of Los Angeles has adopted the policy of forcing potential entrants to
prove financial viability as a necessary precondition, among several others, for receipt of a
competitive franchise. The City has refused to issue competitive franchises even when an
applicant has formally requested one. The Los Angeles cable office director, Susan Herman,
recently stated that the applicant for a cable franchise must first satisfy several requirements,
induding:
Conduct and provide the results of a community ascertainment or marketing study that
may demonstrate that more than one franchisee can economically exist in the franchise
area proposed to be served .... Conduct and provide the results of a study that may
demonstrate that an overbuild in the franchise area proposed will not significantly
cause any or all of the following:
(a) visual blight;
(b) noise pollution;
(c) disruption to the streets, rights of way and residential backyards;
(d) exhausted capacity on utility poles utility ducts; and
114
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The importance of this transaction cost asymmetry is elemental to
the policy analysis in cable entry decisions. Consumer surplus is
positively correlated with multiple entry; only the sunk cost fallacy
attempts to argue the other way. Producers' surplus is negatively
correlated with multiple entry, ceteris paribus. As producers--that is,
multiple entrants-have low costs and clear alternatives in avoiding
losses from entry, and as individual consumers are significantly
constrained by high transactions costs in imposing efficiency either via
economic or political institutions, the benefit of an open entry policy
appears not to be offset by the costs in a fuller model of market
behavior.179
An economic trade-off approach leads Smiley to argue that multiple
franchise awards will improve welfare where capital costs are relatively
low and firms offer relatively differentiated products.' Smiley also
(e) "electronic red-lining".
Letter from Susan Herman, General Manager, Department ofTelecommunications, City of Los
Angeles, to Mr. Harold R. Farrow (Dec. 2, 1986).
This mirrors the historical anticompetitive licensing practices of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Potential entrants were under the burden of proving to the Interstate Commerce
Commission that their rivalry was "required by the present or future public convenience and
necessity...." As Alfred Kahn noted:
It does not suffice that a trucker is willing to take the risks of going into the business
himself; he must convince the [Interstate Commerce] Commission that his services are
required. When the service he proposes would compete, directly or indirectly, with
that offered by an existing carrier, the latter may enter a protest. And in any event the
Commission has pursued an extremely restrictive policy with regard to the issuance of
new licenses. The possibility that the applicants would take business away from
existing carriers has been an important consideration in inducing it to refuse them.
Time and again, it has turned down applications that enjoyed the support of shippers,
on the ground that the service provided by existing carriers either was in its judgement
sufficient or could become so. In short, even an admittedly poor performance by existing
carriers is not necessarily a sufficient justification for permitting more competition.
2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 15 (1971).
179. In this fight, we should be careful to separate self-interested industry statements by
cable incumbents from relevant policy considerations. Revealingly, when the 1987 Malarkey-
Taylor overbuild study, financed by an Arizona firm fighting competitive entry through the
franchising process, was released, a trade publication, MULT1CHANNEL NEWS, headlined the
results: "Study Finds Profits Elusive When Systems Overbuild." Freeman, suprm note 111, at
17. Moreover, the trade journal informed its readers of the study's significance: "An
established operator fighting a proposed overbuild could use such an economic analysis to
convince a city to ask when deciding whether to grant a second, competing franchise whether
in the long run subscribers will benefit or lose in an overbuild . . . ." Id. (statement
paraphrasing study's author). It was not explained how the lost profits stemming from
increased competition hurt consumers.
180. A. SMILEY, supra note 52.
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argues that such pro-competition opportunities must be discovered "on
a case-by-case basis" in so far as "generalizations about the appropriate
role of overbuild competition are likely to be misleading."' 8' Yet a
case-by-case approach fails, in practice, to create entry policy
evaluations based upon economic cost-benefit analysis.'82 Indeed,
given Smiley's conclusion that open entry most frequently maximizes
welfare, the fact that we see so very few local governments pursuing it,
even as city councils deal with their cable franchise on a case-by-case
basis, suggests a rather deterministic result. The equilibrium in the
case-by-case policy rule is very nearly a blanket prohibition on
competition.183
Rational political franchise authorities can craft rent-seeking
competitions in which cable licenses are dispensed to high bidders, yet
the social value of consumer welfare is not likely to be squ:.rely
represented in the auction. The regularity with which incumbent
operators succeed in capturing the exclusive allegiance of local
authorities testifies to the tendency of a case-by-case methodology to be
transformed into a rule-of-thumb. A discretionary policy may, despite
its flexibility or, indeed, because of it, prove inferior to a fixed rule
that, on average, gets it right.'8' This is even more true where
181. Id. at 35.
182. In studying a parallel phenomenon, John Loomis has found that the Reagan
Administration's policy reform mandating that economic efficiency become "the dominant
objective of national forest planning" has not been effective in changing regulatory results:
"Despite the greater emphasis on economic efficiency by the Reagan Administration and in
revised national forest planning regulations, it continues to be just one input into decision
making by regional foresters and forest supervisors." Loomis, Economic Efficiency Analysis,
Bureaucrats, and Budgets: A Test of Hypotheses, 12 W.J. AGRIC. ECON. 27, 32 (1987); see also
Sabatier, The Acquisition and Utilization of Technical Information by Administrative Agencies, 23
ADMIN. SC. Q. 396 (1987).
183. A rather graphic demonstration of this principle involves the translation and influence
of the Smiley paper itself. Smiley concluded that the policy decision to open entry was highly
sensitive to local cost and demand conditions. A. SMILEY, supra note 52, at 34. His article
included a sensitivity analysis where density and market price elasticities were allowed to vary
between a number of plausible benchmark values. Id. at 29-34. In 20 of the 27 hypothetical
duopoly scenarios, welfare under competition was equal to or greater than under monopoly.
See id. at 31 (Table 3). These results, however, were quickly reformulated in a more political
conteXt. The Malarkey-Taylor study discussed above claimed to be based on the Smiley
analysis. Yet its results were quite distinct: The analysis concludes that as a rule, two operators
cannot survive economically in an overbuild, "[a]nd from that point one can look at all kinds
of unpleasant scenarios for the community, city government and the subscribers." Freeman,
supra note 111 (quoting Malarkey-Taylor, Economic Analysis of Cable System Overbuilds
(January, 1987) (unpublished manuscript)).
184. Archibald Cox argues that one of the most important constitutional decisions in U.S.
history was rendered in the Steamboat Monopoly Case, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1 (1824).
A. Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONsTITUION 88 (1987). In holding that New York's exclusive
steamboat franchise was an unconstitutional violation of the interstate commerce clause, the
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private actors with low transactions costs, such as cable company
entrants, have strong incentives not to err even when the chosen policy
allows them to do so.
The transaction costs associated with identifying the true instances
of efficient grants of monopoly franchises may prove crucial in policy
analysis. Franchising agencies committed to any economic efficiency
rule may demand that potential entrants conduct net benefit
estimations. The transaction costs of identifying efficient monopoly
grants are especially formidable given the moral hazard expected of,
and evidenced by, franchising agents. Hence, the cost of a municipal
discretion rule in CATV entry decisions is embodied in F. M. Scherer's
apt admonition that: "Few regulatory agency decisions are more
difficult than determining how the public interest is best served when
new entry threatens what is believed to be a natural monopoly. And
few regulatory agency powers lend themselves so readily to abuse."'i 5
It is interesting, though economically coincidental, that the legal
justification for current challenges to monopoly cable franchises is the
constitutional standing of excluded competitors to exercise their rights
to free speech as electronic publishers. The First Amendment is the
ultimate non-discretionary rule, stating that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. ,, 86 a
provision that can best be understood as a calculated trade-off
sacrificing regulatory flexibility for a higher mean market outcome,
given all relevant constraints. That is, while much frivolous,
misleading, and antisocial speech, not to mention socially wasteful press
duplication, theoretically could be eliminated by pro-consumer
regulation, the cost would entail entrusting large blocks of discretionary
authority to political agents. In this context, market power (or some
other antisocial quality) possessed by a private unregulated supplier of
news and entertainment services is judged less harmful than the
alternative: monopoly power by regulators acting as buying agents for
consumers. The Supreme Court reached just this conclusion in the
Supreme Court ruled against states seeking to promote local advantage by selfish regulation
or taxation of interstate trade. Id. at 89. While Cox misunderstands local advantage-it was
surely an advantage to organized interests and a disadvantage to local consumers that
monopolies were created-his key point is particularly relevant: allowing local authorities to
use political discretion in the creation of monopoly rights may well be inimical to the broader
public interest.
185. F. SCHER, supra note 66, at 485. Indeed, the negative impact on consumer welfare
discerned from evidence on cable franchising examined in Beutel, sura note 50, Compettion
v. Franchise Monopoly, supra note 49, and Zupan, supra note 45, and discussed above, see supra
text and table accompanying notes 85-88 & 98-100, suggests that the agency dilemma which
Scherer describes forms a vital consideration in such markets.
186. U.S. Const. amend. I.
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classic First Amendment newspaper precedent, Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.8 7
In Trnilo, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
existence of market power in the hands of the Miami Herald
Publishing Co. in the southern Florida newspaper market gave the
Florida legislature the right to compel the Miami Herald to offer a
political candidate equal space for a response to an editorial attack.
The Supreme Court viewed the First Amendment as designed to
eliminate governmental discretion in public policy towards newspapers.
The Court made its point with a terse opinion that itself failed to
entertain interests competitive with an unregulated press sector. Lucas
Powe defines the message embodied therein:
A succinct rejection [of press regulation] was the best way to
demonstrate that the old constitutional rights were still valid.
Further discussion would just have opened the door to further
litigation, and the point of the Court's opinion was that no
matter how compelling a right of reply might seem, further
litigation was not needed because, as Justice Jackson noted in a
different context, the First Amendment "was designed to avoid
these ends by avoiding these beginnings.'1
8 8
What the welfare calculus would look like if it were costlessly
discoverable, then, helps us a good deal less than knowing the likely
results of a process in which decisionmakers can maximize in
dimensions difficult to monitor, largely unconstrained by consumer
welfare or freedom of speech criteria. From the markets studied in this
Article, competitive cable entry appears to be costly to incumbents and
potential monopoly incumbents. Rent seeking, including investments
in the political marketplace to erect and protect entry barriers, will
predictably result.8 9
187. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
188. Powe, Tomi&lo, 8 Sup. CT. R.v. 345, 393 (1987) (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943)).
189. It is crucial to remember that entry barriers are virtually never enacted as forthrightly
anticompetitive propositions, but rather as seemingly even-handed policies which, in fact,
deliver biased, monopolistic results. See, e.g., A. KAHN, supra note 178, at 15. Gerald Falhauber
has observed and described this self-preservation tactic:
commissions tend to observe several rules, one of the most important being to avoid
imposing harms that can be directly traced by the victims to regulation. Another useful
gimmick is to describe inefficiencies as "victories," "protecting competition," or "helping
poor people."
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If legal monopoly may be justified with evidence proving natural
monopoly, such proofs will generally be a steal given the profitability
associated with exclusive CATV franchises. In the public policy world,
the evidence concerning market structure and the vitality of
competitive forces is not impartially derived. The franchising process
will calculate such parameters within the context of political self-
interest. Because industry profits are maximized under the monopoly
scenario, and because firms that seek to enter under competitive
conditions cannot effectively take credit for or appropriate the social
gains from competition (which accrue as increased consumer surplus),
a discretionary public policy will likely be biased not towards
maximization of social welfare, but towards maximization of rent. For
purposes of policy evaluation, economic analysis should not exclude
this fundamental consideration.
G. FALHAuBER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TURMOIL: TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY 161
(1987).
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